Uncertainty Into The System Contract Agent Behavior

In the principle-agent theory, the share contract, which is a mechanism of compensation for agent's bearing risk, is increasingly focused by scholars. Under the analytical framework of the principal-agent theory and the transaction cost theory, this thesis will apply stochastic optimal control model to analyze the agent's action and welfare under uncertainty and a share contract.Firstly, this paper has proposed the research theme, summarized the theory development and research status in quo and introduced the research angle of the paper; secondly, with constructing a mathematic model, this paper has analyzed the agent's action under the share contract. The primary conclusions of the paper are as follows: with all the external conditions being constant, the agent's level of effort will not change and will be independent of the proportion of the share contract. In order to increase this level, we have to change the agent's operation situation. According to our study, the agent's level of effort relates more to the uncertainty of the agent's situation than to his risk-averse extent and his subjective discount rate. The more uncertainty of the agent's production, the more endeavor of the agent In addition, the agent's endowment has negative relation to his endeavor and has positive relation to his welfare.The structure of this paper is arranged as follows:Part I is Chapter I , which includes a general summarization of both the theory development and the research status in quo of the share contract theory , the research purpose and the research angle of this thesis.Part II is divided into two Chapters (Chapters II, Chapters III). Under the analytical framework of the principal-agent theory and the transaction cost theory, we have applied stochastic optimal control model to analyze theagent's action and welfare under uncertainty and a share contract. Our purpose is to get a clearer recognition of the operation mechanism of the share contract. Chapters II is the formation and analysis of the basic model. Chapters III is the formation and analysis of the expanding modeLPart III is Chapter IV and Conclusions. In which we mention the status in quo of the incentive mechanism in Chinese enterprises and the consulting significance of this thesis to the incentive mechanism design in Chinese enterprise(Chapter IV). Finally we sum-up the primary conclusions and policy suggestions of this thesis (Conclusions).