| Ⅰ The significance of this thesisRevenue is becoming more and more important in the economic system of our country with the development of economic reform and the standardization of the government functions. However, tax evasion is still prevailing in our economy for many reasons although the government has taken strong measures against tax evasion. Of course, we have made some progress with the taxation system, but the result is not yet satisfactory. Therefore, The author hopes to find an analytical method that can relate each side of the taxation system relation with the tax evasion.In this thesis, the author tries to exercise the analytical method of "game theory" to analyse the difference between taxpayer's behavior and tax-collector's behavior. By the way of the game theory, the author hopes to find a way to restrain the behaviors of both sides, make them pay the tax on time and levy the tax according to the taxation laws.Ⅱ The basic methods and online of this thesisThe basic line of this thesis is as follows: Firstly, analyse the non-standard behavior of both sides; Secondly, exercise the analytical method of "game theory" in order to analyse the inner behaviour of both sides; Following this, optimize their behaviors through three aspect:the taxation consciousness, taxation system and taxation regulation.Ⅲ The main contents and view points of this thesis(a) The theoretic analysis of taxpayer' behavior and tax-collector' behaviorThe ultimate goal of restraining the behaviors of two sides is to standardize their behaviors so that the revenue is enough and is received on time. Taxpayer and tax-collector belong to different bodis,but they should be compatible with each other and cooperate with each other. Also, they have different objectives, therefore we should standardize their behaviors separately.(b) The game theory analysis of taxpayer' behavior and tax-collector' behaviorIn this thesis, the author mades a conclusion by the game theory model of taxation checking, that is, the more cost the tax evasion will pay, the more tax they will evade. Then the author makes another conclusion from the game theory model of collusion of taxpayer and tax-collector, that is, when all the taxpayers consider their benefit and all the tax-collectors do their best to seek benefit, the only result is all taxpayers will bribe the tax-collectors. Similarly, the author makes a conclusion from the game theory model of prompting the system in the revenue office and prompting system between government and revenue office. That is to say, the government should design a system that can relate the result of tax-collection to prompting and punishment. Therefore, by this system, the government can inspire the revenue office and tax-collectors to levy tax actively.(c) The real examples of taxpayer's and tax-collector' behavior analysis during the reforming time.The thesis enumerates some abnormal behavior of taxpayer and tax-collector. And it analyses its reason in depth.(d) The optimization of taxpayer' behavior and tax-collector' behavior1)Optimization of taxation consciousness. Make the taxpayers realize that the tax they pay is just the price they pay for the use of those public goods or public services. As a result, taxpayers will change their mind that paying tax is painful.2)Optimization of the taxation system. The author does not think a taxation system which is not in effect has any value, so the taxation system must harmonize with the tax-collection system. In this part, the author probes into the co-operation between the taxation system and tax-collection. 3)Optimization of tax-collection model. In this thesis, the author considers optimizing the tax-collection model through three aspect: supervising the source of tax, consummate the taxation checking system and service for the taxpayer.4)According to the result of "game theory" analysis, the author makes a conclusion that the government should enlarge the benefit to the taxpayer and the cost of tax e... |
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