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Asymmetric Information To Eliminate The Risk Of Project Selection

Posted on:2004-12-14Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:G W ZhouFull Text:PDF
GTID:2206360125957077Subject:Technical Economics and Management
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
There are often cases that information asymmetries widespread in any economic active. It is especially serious in venture capital. With the use of Game Theory, the paper studies the problem of clearing up asymmetry of information in the venture capital project-selecting.At first, the paper points out that, in the venture capital project-selecting, there are four stages in which the information asymmetries exist, that is: whether or not the project is true; whether or not there are some serious risk hided in the project; whether or not the anticipated return is earned in the same information range; whether or not the anticipated return is earned according to the same rule that the information influences the result. After studied the character of information asymmetry in four stages, the paper frames the mechanisms to get the inner information of enterpriser. Based on these, it analyzes the work of clearing up information asymmetry, such as, the influences of clearing up information asymmetry on economic decision; the way to measuring the extent of information asymmetry; the economic value measurement of clearing up information asymmetries. After these, the paper continues to study the same problem in multi-project-selecting among numerous projects. It points out that there are three kinds of asymmetries in the work, that is: the asymmetry between investor and enterpriser and in enterprisers themselves. After these analyses, the paper in the end has a result that the second-price public-bidding is a good way to clearing up asymmetry of information.
Keywords/Search Tags:clearing up asymmetry of information, venture capital project-selecting, game
PDF Full Text Request
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