Control Over The Factors Listed Companies In The Financing Decision

Financial structure is one of the most important issues in corporate finance, and the decision-making of a reasonable financial structure has been an important content of modern enterprise administration. Existing researches have shown that the voting rights play an important role in the design of financial structures of listed companies. This thesis reviews the theory of capital structure, especially the theoretical thoughts and relevant positive researches of the school of market for corporate control. And on the basis of China's particular system, we select the listed companies with the qualifications for equity offering in two different ways as the research subject, and empirically investigate the relationship between the choose of financing ways, voting rights structure and stock price changes.Compared with western ripe market, the voting rights show a different influence on the financial structure of listed companies in our country. To be specific, the empirically investigation is consisted of two parts mainly: First, we investigate the role of voting rights in the decision-making of two feasible financing way; Second, we want to know when the market learns the financing announcement, whether there exist differences on the stock price effects between two financing ways and among the different voting rights structures under the same financing way. We select the listed companies with the announcement of equity offering during Mar. 15,2001 -Jul.24,2002. The results indicate that voting rights have an influence on the decision-making of financial structure, and the market will make different responses to the financing announcements of listed companies with different ownership structures.More specifically, this thesis is arranged in six chapters. Each chapter's content is following:Chapter 1 is introduction part. In this chapter, we explain the intention of this research and what this thesis's structure is. Besides, we explain several conceptions related to the thesis.Chapter 2 reviews the relevant research documents on the theory of capital structure with the emphasis on the school of market for corporate control. On the basis of introducing the theoretical origins of the school of market for corporate control, this chapter also discusses the theoretical models of market for corporate control and some empirical researches related.In chapter 3, on the basis of the development of capital market of our country we point out the specific research questions and the hypotheses to be testified.Chapter 4 is research methodology introduction part. First of all, we introduce the materials' source and the process of samples selection. Then, we illuminate the research methods to test the hypotheses above.In Chapter 5, we summarize the empirical findings and make further analyses. Studies have shown that the companies choosing public offerings are larger firms with higher a (Share holding proportion of the biggest shareholder), more concentrated ownership, lower proportion of tradable shares. Moreover, compared with right offering, the announcements of public offer will induce lower abnormal returns, and no matter right offering or public offering, the market's reactions to the announcement of the companies with the a within the interval of [30%, 50%) are obviously stronger than those of other companies within other two intervals.In the end, we give a general summary about the above findings. Some preliminary policy recommendations are made. Some limitation in this thesis and future research issues are also discussed in this chapter.