Evidence Of Modern Dividend Policy Based On Asymmetric Information Analysis

Dividend policy is an important content of corporate financial policies, as well as a problem that frustrates Chinese listed companies and governance institutions. Based on the asymmetric information economics, this paper not only reviews the modern dividend policy from agency cost hypothesis and signaling hypothesis, but also makes an empirical analysis of dividend policy of Chinese listed companies and wants to have a positive effect for companies and governance institutions to make relevant policy and regulations. Foragency cost hypothesis, the paper introduces its new trend----agency problembetween large shareholdings and small shareholdings, and makes an analysis of agency problem in China. For signaling theory, the paper emphasizes its application in China. Empirical study shows: first, dividend-payout ratios is irrelevant to the capital structure and development circle and there is serious agency problem of Chinese listed companies; second, the change in dividend of Chinese listed companies does not give the information regarding the future earning change of the related companies. At last, this paper tries to give some advice to governance institutions to protect the investors.