Imbalance Of Information, The Efficiency Of The Transaction And Intermediary Market Crux Of The Problem

This thesis found the trade efficiency and medium market restrict the development of secondhand-house buying and selling market through investigating and analyzing our country's secondhand-house current situation of buying and selling. After further analyzing, we found that the important reason for these problems is asymmetry information of all the market participators. At premise of asymmetry information, the thesis use games model of imperfect information to analyze the trade efficiency and medium market problems in the secondhand-house buying and selling market. We found some major conclusions:(1) The extensive existence of asymmetry information not only reduces the enthusiasm of secondhand-house buyers, but also buyers easily purchase the secondhand-house of poor quality in the market which can lead to the trade efficiency's droppings.(2) The extensive existence of asymmetry information not only reduces the enthusiasm of authorizer and associated medium agency, but also reduces the quality of medium agency in the market.(3) In the condition of existence of asymmetry information, there is a lack of medium agency restriction which will reduce information transmission between the authorizer and associated medium agency, which will aggravate the asymmetry information between them. The lack of restriction will make medium agencies choose to break their promises more commonly.At last, the thesis put forward exercisable proposals on the basis of the above game analysis conclusion.