Between Theory And Reality: The Bush Administration's China Strategy And Policy Choice

How to cope with the rising power in the international system has always been a theoretic and tough issue facing the existing hegemonic state. As the rise of China has become the major dynamic in transforming the contemporary international system, how to perceive and deal with it in a proper way is posing an unavoidable and historic issue for the U.S.---the only hegemony in the current international system.The main body of this thesis is comprised of two parts. One is concerned with the tendency of the strategic perception and consequent China policies of Bush's Administration. The other, which has close ties with the former, is the theoretic arguments over the ways of how the existing superpower deals with the rising power. The author elaborates on the features of Bush's Administration China policies at different stages and related theories and thinking on one hand, and conducts case studies which are typical in U.S.-China relations on the other. Meanwhile, the author tries to make use of the theory of perception to explore the hidden force behind the decision-making body of Bush's Administration and testify the connection between the shift of the strategic perception and the adjustment of U.S. China policy at different stages, expecting to make a preliminary assessment and prediction of U.S. China policy in the future.Currently, the U.S. strategic circle's perception of the characteristics, the strategic intention as well as the way and speed of China's rise is still at the stage of observation, identification and estimation. The deferent U.S. China policy is more or less decided upon what the U.S. perceives China. Focusing on the study of the U.S. China policy in the past over 5 years, the author argues that the strategic perception and China policy of Bush's Administration roughly underwent 3 stages, all of which manifest the logic of the theories on how to deal with the rising power. At the first stage (before September 11, 2001), China was perceived as a"peer competitor"by the U.S., whose China policy was featuring more containment and less engagement. At the second stage (before Zoellick's speech), China was perceived as a"constructive collaborator". The U.S. could not continue the containment policy and was obliged to conduct the engagement policy instead. At the third stage (since Zoellick's speech), the U.S. anticipated China to be a"responsible stake-holder". The hedging off of the dual strategy of shaping plus defending features the U.S. China policy of this stage.To conclude, the author believes although the foundation of Sino-U.S. relations has been stabilized on one hand, the pendulum of the U.S. China policy still works. The swinging frequency and scope of the pendulum would rest with how major events would test and shape the bilateral relations in the future. On the other hand, the author argues that since the international system is entering a unipolar world dominated by the U.S., the U.S. will take China's support even active participation in the international system as one of the long-term strategies in order to obtain legitimacy of hegemony or reduce hegemonic obligations. Thus, if China and the U.S. could accommodate each other in a healthy and positive way and constitute a long-term and deep-set foundation for mutual strategic perception, the two countries would probably avoid the dilemma of the rising power and get on the way of win-win and harmonious development despite the differences.