Open Government Information Analysis And Countermeasure Research Of The Rent-seeking Behavior

Regarding government information publicity as a kind of social activity and economic behavior, from a case study of information rent-seeking, this paper aims at the Interests among Information Rent-seeking Activities (IRA), and attempts to explain the complexity of information rent-seeking problem and the root of low efficiency in government information publicity from a new angle of view, and a viewpoint that founding fair and efficient government information publicity institution is promoted in order to apply scientific reference to information rent-seeking.In this paper, Game Theory and Stakeholder Theory are employed to analyses varied conflicts in government information publicity activities, from which a systematic analytical framework for IRA is fabricated, which comes out 4 game models, such as Tragedy of Commons, principal-agent model, Herding effect and dynamic game of incomplete information, to explain the interest conflicts among the governments, rent-seeking enterprise and government branches. A conclusion that the unbalance of IRA is the sticking point of low efficiency, and construction of efficient institution should base on interest adjustment is drawn out. This paper suggests that legal lever, economic lever, administrative lever, and public supervising, such as founding an Government-information -fair regulation, increasing the fine to lawbreakers, establishing reasonable interest compensating mechanism, and reforming the merit system, should be employed in the adjustment of IRA.On account of the immaturity of information & resources value accounting methods, the researches involved in stakeholders and the game of IRA is a new direction. Due to the difficulties in quantitative analysis of IRA, farther study is in need in the future.