Ownership Structure And Corporate Governance Performance Studies

Corporate governance is a kind of institution to cope with different sorts of contracts, to coordinate and standard the relationship among stake -holders. Equity ownership structure (EOS) is the base of corporate governance which affects firm performance by its governance mechanism. In my opinion, the inefficiency of the listed company's performance is closely related to the irreasonableness of listed company's EOS.The thesis sets out from the importance of EOS and the present conditions of Chinese listed company's EOS, appraising the shortcoming of the studies at present. It analyzes the relations between EOS and corporate governance, corporate mechanism, and corporate performance. Then from multiple perspectives such as equity property, concentration rate, circulation, and managerial equity, I discuss the correlation between listed companies' EOS and performance by using a lot of positive research. I will also bring up suggestion regarding Chinese EOS in order to enhance the listed companies' performance.This dissertation consists four parts:The first part raises problems and points out the significance and the thinking of the whole thesis. In this part, I elaborate the importance of the listed companies' EOS to corporate governance and firm performance and the irreasonableness of the present listed company's EOS. Then I points out the thinking of the whole dissertation.The second part focuses on the theoretical research about the listed companies' EOS and firm performance. First, I summarize foreign and domestic studies on EOS and commets on the shortcoming of them from equity holders, analyzing levels, and indexes of performance. Then I elaborate the concept and connotation of the listed companies' EOS and firm performance. At the following, I analyze the relations between EOS and corporate governance, corporate mechanism, and corporateperformance. At last, I bring up suggestion that reasonable and moderate EOS shoud be built to enhance the listed companies' performance.The third part makes positive studies on relationship of Chinese listed companies' EOS and firm performance from equity property, concentration rate, circulation, and managerial equity. The study on relationship of equity property and firm performance suggests that in competitive business, the relationship between percentage of legal-person shares and firm performance is cubic; in less than competitve business, the relationship between percentage of state-owned shares, percentage of legal-person shares and firm performance is cubic too. The study on relationship of concentration rate and firm performance suggests that in competitive business, the firm performance of decentralized EOS is better than centralized EOS; in less than competitve business, the situation is opposite. The study on relationship of managerial equity and firm performance suggests that in competitive business and in less than competitve business, the firm performance has nothing to do with managerial equity, but managerial reward has direct proportion to do with firm performance. The study on relationship of circulation and firm performance suggests that in competitive business and in less than competitve business, the firm performance has nothing to do with circulation.The fourth part gives conclusions and suggestions on perfecting EOS and improving firm performance of Chinese listed companies on the basis of the above study.