State-owned Enterprise Managers Incentives

The issues of state-owned enterprises in China are basically caused by the defect of system. These problems are incentives and restrictions to the manager, rather than system. If they have not been solved, any kind of systems can't solve the problem of state-owned enterprise's energy. Then how does the owner of state-owned enterprises in China—the country inspire the managers? This is what the thesis is going to answer. The thesis is divided into six chapters.The first chapter researches on analyzing the behavior of the managers. The system of incentives and restrictions to managers is a series of systematic measures to restrict the choices of managers' behavior. It is a kind of system arrange. The second chapter studies the common theories of incentives. It focuses on incentive system of high-ranking managers. The third chapter discusses the manager incentive practice of our state-owned enterprises, which include substance incentive, spirit incentive, control incentive, and so on. The fourth chapter focuses on the yearly salary incentive system of state-owned enterprises. The fifth chapter studies the administration incentive system of state-owned enterprises managers. The sixth chapter investigates the incentive of stock option and the substitute relation of stock option incentives and control power incentives. Being an incentive system working a long time, stock option has done a lot to optimize configure and improve the structure of corporation administering. If we can use rational project of stock option incentives to managers, the structure of incentive system will be optimized. It is significant to improve the efficiency of managing, the structure of corporation administering and the building of modern corporations and protect the rights of shareholders. The conclusion makes some suggestion of the substitute relation of stock option incentives and control power incentives in state-owned enterprises.