Font Size: a A A

Managers Stock Options Accounting Recognition And Measurement Of Problem Research

Posted on:2007-01-17Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:R J XiaFull Text:PDF
GTID:2209360185491517Subject:Accounting
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
This main objective of this dissertation is to study the recognition and measurement of Executive Stock Option, which is a long-term incentive system invented in 1950s by an American company. For the distinct superiority on incentive effect and cost, ESO has attracted more and more attention in 1970s, and then got a large popularity among US companies. In 1990s, some enterprises in China have tried to apply the system, there must be more and more Chinese enterprises applying the incentive system with the improving of external environment, such as the laws, the capital market.The dissertation has found an economic explanation which supports the opinion of that the compensation cost should be recognized, which is the result of a direct analysis of the course in which Executive Stock Option plans are practiced. A logic framework of the accounting for Executive Stock Option has been built in the dissertation. The economic explanation and the logic framework are the basis of recognition and measurement.The dissertation has also found an important factor which must be considered in calculating the fluctuation rate of share price.The dissertation has suggested that the accounting information of Executive Stock Option should be disclosed as a part of affiliation disclosure. The reason is that the accounting standard in China regards the top managers as the affiliated person of enterprise and Executive Stock Option is granted to top managers usually.
Keywords/Search Tags:Executive Stock Option, Recognition, Measurement
PDF Full Text Request
Related items