| As an effective resource allocation mode and price seeking mechanism, auctions have been expanded from the traditional local auctions to the online auctions. It has been an important e-business pattern by means of the extensive transaction means with little limited and the rapid increasing of transaction sum. Therefore, researches on online auctions show the essentiality more and more.By comparative analyse aiming at the online auctions, we find that most of online auctions focus on C2C and put up the characteristic of one seller to many buyers or one buyer to many sellers. Further, because of these problems in online auctions, such as"slamming","winner's curse", it easily result in decreasing the rate of customer's satisfaction; and the transaction time always was set up long as soon as possible for assurance to attract more auctioneers and their utility maximization, which easily result in higher auction costs.Because the many to many structure in double auction market is fit for the transaction among many buyers and sellers on internet especially, and the famous"Smith's Mystery"opened out the characteristics of double auction: Even with insufficient information of supply and demand and a small number of traders, the double auction can achieve very high market efficiency and converge rapidly to a competitive equilibrium price. This characteristic provides us an important theoretic gist which can preferably solve how to utilize the network resource effectively and ease the network burden through the online double auction.Bases on the background of the online double auctions by means of traditional auction theory, game theory and experimental economics, this paper adopts the continuous double auction as the implement model of the online double auction. Following this idea, considering the serious information asymmetry and personal expect utility maximization in the double auction, we intends to construct a bidding model on Bayesian Nash equilibrium based on incomplete information games, consequently obtain a solution on each private values and maximum forecast price and minimum forecast price on the marketing.Then, We analyze in detail the characters and possibilities of the offer strategy by means of computer simulation according to the experimental economics. Finally the... |