The Research On A Game Theory Toward A Valuation Of CERs From CDM Projects

Kyoto protocol provided valuable references for carbon pricing and introduced clean development mechanism to solve carbon emission problem. Under the CDM, the developed country acquires the right of carbon emissions he needed by providing investment and technology transfer to underdevelopment country. Nowadays, china has become most important supplier of CERs in the international carbon emission right trade market. However, the foreign country lead in the carbon market and possess the right of carbon pricing, which causes china at a disadvantage and has to accept very low price set by foreign carbon institutions. The study on carbon pricing in the CDM will help us to learn more about international carbon market and enable us acquire more revenues in carbon emission trade. Moreover, it has great importance on the participation of china into agreement of CERs price involved in CDM project.This paper analyzed the definition of carbon emission from the monetary aspect, and explained the externality and coasian theory which involved in carbon emission. Then, we summarize merit and fault of all of the three pricing method of CERs in CDM .Therefore, this paper introduced 4 tiers of principal-agent model in game theory to proposes a set of new pricing method. Then,we introduced the hierarchy of the global carbon market and category of carbon emission, and investigated the activities in the CDM market between developed and underdeveloped countries, JI and EU ETS market of developed countries and voluntary market in detail. Furthermore, and analyze various scenario of the interaction among participants and we discovered Nash equilibrium in a CDM project game and the evaluation of CERs, and reached two conclusions:(1)In a CDM project, an underdeveloped country shirks in a project when a developed country will get all emission rights in a contract(2)If there is no arbitrage trade, the value of CERs from a CDM project would be determined by a market price of emission rights( P ),the ratio of allocation of CERs between an underdeveloped country and adeveloped country in CDM contracts(γ),the ratio of the market share which an underdeveloped country gets from a developed country in other products markets because of know-how which an underdeveloped country gets in CDM projects( m ),initial costs of CDM projects which a developed country must pay( I ),the probability that an underdeveloped country and a developed country get CERs when an underdeveloped country works hard in CDM projects (α), where P,m,I was positively correlated with CERs price,α,γwas negatively correlated with CERs price.Finally ,we intent to put forward the policy suggestions from various aspects, such as supporting policies, RMB internationalization,factor market and financial innovation.