| The doctor-patient relationship is the specific heal relationship of medical staff and patients occurring in the medical process, is the key in a medical treatment inrelationship and play a decisive role to medical effect. Along with the science development and the progress of the society, the understanding of People of health and disease is also in constant deepening, The processes of doctor-patient relationship is not good, The medical dispute has become be more and more difficult in hospitals, health and social development,and has faced with many new challenges. Building harmonious doctor-patient relationship has become the focus of the national medical institutions and even attention of the whole society.From China's actual situation, the doctor-patient relationship is nervous, the doctor-patient conflict is also nervous. The Causing of the doctor-patient relationship nervous reason is various, such as medical agency sided pursuit of economic interests, the medical staff irresponsible, medical technology not jing, a party to "own rights" grasp etiology, the lack of or distribution inequality of medical resources. But in essence, the deep reason of hospital patient relationship is our country society is in transition, the hospital positioning has happened deviation, and medical system is not complete.This paper, from the Angle of information asymmetry, using the information economics related theory, study patients and hospital (doctor) between benefit gambling. Patients for information a disadvantage, namely the principal; Hospital (doctor) for information on one side of the advantage, known as agent, according to the information economics and the game theory, information asymmetry cause client adverse selection and moral hazard agent, which causes the disputes.,according to the information economics and the game theory, information asymmetry cause client adverse selection and moral hazard agent, which causes the disputes.This paper concluded the research results:(1)For the principal-agent relation modeling between patients and hospital (doctor), the use of quantitative methods to analysis solution the agency problems between patients and hospital (doctor).(2) made two kind of incentive mechanism-explicit incentive and implicit incentives, Explicit incentive mechanism motivates and constraints on hospital (doctor) using terms of the contract; Hidden incentive mechanism motivates and constraints on hospital (doctor) using of medical market.(3) Use quantitative method to prove the hospital (doctor) relative performance comparison, phases pay medical expenses explicit incentive mechanism to hospital (doctor) has the very good incentive effect.(4) Use KMRW reputation model principle established a on hospital (doctor) of the implicit incentive model, to solve the hospital (doctor) of the moral risk of the problem. |
