Civil Liability Of Credit Rating Agencies

The Credit Rating Agencies is a special kind of intermediary service organizations in the stock market, which plays an important role in reduce the informational dissymmetry and systematic insecurity. Therefore, the investors rely on raying reports in making their decisions. When important parts in these information have some errors and results in loss to investors, the Credit Rating Agencies should respond in damages for these investors. Investors are not the opposition but the third party in contract with sponsors. Aiming at the difficulties of the research on the Credit Rating Agencies'the civil responsibility to the third party, the author explores questions such as:the nature of sponsors', the responsibility principle of the Credit Rating Agencies.the causality in sponsor's tort liability, the confirmation of sponsors'fault in work and the characters, extent, number of compensation.Besides the preface, this dissertation is divided into fore parts.The first part is the locate statement on the Credit Rating Agencies'civil liability to the third party. First of all, the Credit Rating Agencies'civil liability for the third was examined. The study locates in the false statements in the case of securities, and the Credit Rating Agencies should be responsible for investment losses on securities when false statement happened. The civil liability has some characteristics. Secondly, the text aims at the nature of civil liability on the Credit Rating Agencies to the third party. Lists the current academic nature of this responsibility to the main theory and analyze their respective advantages and disadvantages, I believe that the nature of the Credit Rating Agencies to the third party should be tort liability.Part two analysis the responsibility principle of the Credit Rating Agencies, this part evaluates domestic scholar's controversy upon the responsibility principle of the Credit Rating Agencies' civil liability,through appraises the legislation in this aspect in foreign countries and Taiwan district, the author insist that the responsibility principle of the Credit Rating Agencies'civil liability should be presumptive wrongs.The third part explores the confirmation of the Credit Rating Agencies'civil liability. The civil law scholars have long debated upon the subjective doctrine and objective doctrine regarding the confirmation of civil liability fault. The most countries'law has adopted objective doctrine to indentify the actor's fault. The criterion to judge whether the Credit Rating Agencies are subjectively in fault is their "occupational prudence". About the identification of causality, the author through comparison between two major legal systems'causality theories, identify the causal link between the false statements in securities acting from the Credit Rating Agencies and investors'losses.The fourth part discusses the assumption of the Credit Rating Agencies'tort liability and compensation for damage. Firstly, analysis of domestic and international legislation and judicial practice for the scope of the "third person"; The second issue is who should assume the Credit Rating Agencies'civil liability; at last, In drawing the damages in the false statements in securities in the United States, the paper present that the first step on the calculation of the amount of compensation should be removed the factors which is not share of false statements, and the second should to ascertain the amount of compensation according to different loss amount in different circumstances in false statements in securities.