The Research On The Relationship Between The Ownership Structure Of Listed Companies And Earnings Mangement

In recent years, earnings management has always been a hot research topic in overseas accounting theory horizon, with the rapid development of stock market of our country, earnings management of listed companies has become increasingly prominent, and it is also gradually focused by the accounting theory horizon, the regulators and the investors of our country. Earnings management behavior of listed companies may cause a serious distortion of accounting information, which make the accounting information quality can not be effectively guaranteed, so that the interest of investors has been greatly damaged. Earnings management behavior of listed companies is affected by many factors, according to the current theoretical and empirical research, earnings management is largely caused by the defect of corporate governance structure, as the basis of corporate governance, the reasonable degree of the ownership structure will necessarily have an impact on earnings management. In addition, the start of the non-tradable share reform in 2005 announced the entire circulation time is coming; non-tradable shares unlocked and other share reform effects directly caused the changes of stock equity structure of listed companies in our country. Combined with the actual background, it has very important theoretical meaning and practical significance to explore the relationship between the stock equity structure and earnings management.In this paper, we used Cross-Sectional Modified Jones Model and selected China A-share listed companies in 2009 after the share reform as the samples, to comprehensively explore the effect relationships of ultimate control right, outside block holders, the nature of the ultimate controlling shareholders, managerial ownership and stock holding of institutional investors on earnings management from the level of earnings management, the positive earnings management and the negative earnings management three angles. Empirical test results show that:(1) If the ratio of the ultimate control right is higher, the range of earnings management would be greater. (2) If the outside block holders are higher, the range of positive earnings management would be smaller. (3) Due to the government's "care" of the state-owned listed companies, the motivation of positive earnings management was significantly less than non-state-owned listed companies; there was no significant difference in negative earnings management. (4)The proportion of managerial ownership in our country is generally low, which results in the proportion of managerial ownership has no significant impact on earnings management behavior of listed companies. (5) If the stock holding of institutional investors is higher, the range of positive earnings management would be smaller; with the increase in the stock holding of institutional investors, the impact of the ultimate control right on the range of earnings management was significantly reduced.