Empirical Research On Influence To Investment Behavior Of Listed Companies By Ownership Structure

Investment decision is the key of the three financial decision-making in a company, and is of great concern with the corporate value and long-term development. Thus, studies based on a non-efficient investment behavior (over-investment or under-investment) is always been the concern of scholars home and abroad. It is a kinds of significant method of investment behavior to analyze the effects of different ownership structure on investment-cash flow sensitivity and verify the underlying motivation from the company's investment and cash flow sensitivity which is responsible to company's investment behavior and put the ownership structure into the analytical framework.Ownership structure mainly includes two factors of equity ownership concentration and the nature. Changes in any one factor which will lead to changes on main actors of the corporate control and the relationship between behavior subjects, which will eventually affect the company's investment behavior and internal cash flow sensitivity. According to this idea, the paper selects the data of listed manufacturing companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from the year 2005-2009, testing the existence of the investment and cash flow sensitivity and the motive firstly; and then the paper divides the sample data from two dimensions of ownership concentration and the ownership nature, tests the influence to investment-cash flow sensitivity caused by the supervision effect, tunneling effect, the convergence of interest effect from the behavior of the largest shareholder in the three ownership concentration states, and compares the differences on investment-cash flow sensitivity of state-owned and non-state listed companies under the three ownership concentration situation; Finally, the paper tests the impact results of from the largest shareholder, that a listed company's performance of excessive or insufficient investment under three acts.The main conclusions of the paper include:1.The paper verifies the existence of the listed investment-cash flow sensitivity and the reasons behind the existence, finding that:(1) There are sensitivity and a tendency to over-investment between investment and cash flow in full sample of listed companies.(2) the state-owned listed companies have significant over-investment behavior in the whole, and non-state ownership listed companies does not exist phenomenon of over-investment.2.The paper divides the sample data from two dimensions of ownership concentration and the ownership nature, verifying the influence to investment-cash flow sensitivity caused by the supervision effect, tunneling effect and interests convergence effect of the largest shareholder, finding that:(1)Supervision by the effects of the largest shareholder, the interests convergence effect of the whole sample of listed companies in investment-cash flow sensitivity factor will be reduced; tunnel effect in the first major shareholder will makes cash flow coefficient increases significantly.(2)When the ownership is dispersing, the supervision effect of the largest shareholder in non-state listed companies is more significant than the state-owned listed companies, with the shareholding proportion of the largest shareholder increases, the decline in the investment-cash flow coefficient is greater in non-state investment in listed companies than in state-owned listed companies; when the ownership is in balance, the restrict of other shareholders to the largest shareholder is greater in the non-state ownership listed companies than state-owned listed companies, resulting the investment-cash flow sensitivity coefficients is larger in state-owned listed company than non-state listed company; when the ownership is in interests concentration, the interests convergence effect of the largest shareholders will makes the investment-cash flow coefficient decrease in state-owned listed companies, and for non-state-owned listed companies, it is unfeasible to verify the role of the convergence effect from the major shareholders from sensitivity between investment and cash flow.(3)Because of the first three effects of the largest shareholders, the relationship between the proportion of the largest shareholders and investment-cash flow sensitivity is nonlinear in the entire sample, the state-owned, non-state ownership listed companies.3.The paper tests the influence caused by the three effects of the largest shareholders to the investment behavior of listed companies, finding that:(1)When the ownership is changing from dispersing to concentration, the behavior of over-investment is significant.(2) When the ownership is dispersing, there is no over-investment behavior in the state-owned listed companies, and when the ownership is in balance and in concentration, the inclination of over-investment is obvious; non-state ownership listed companies do not exist over-investment problems under all kinds of ownership structure states.