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Study On The Effective Supply Of GSSL

Posted on:2012-11-01Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:J C WangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2219330338955951Subject:Educational Economy and Management
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Along with China's higher education popularization and the process of the implementation of the "cost sharing mechanism" at the beginning of 1999, National Student Loan plays a vital role in the college students funding system. GSSL are executing with carrying the government warmly expectation that "not let a student out of school because of family financial difficulties" as well as revealing the education equity and social justice that "let every student to enjoy equal opportunities in education".The GSSL economic analysis mainly includes two aspects, one is the demand, and the other is supply. It mainly involves five interest main bodies that the central government, bank, the local government, university and loan student (family). The article has three hypotheses. The first one is that the demand of the National Student Loan is "actual demand". Then the local government and the central government in the supply level as a benefit body "government". At last, the two interest main bodies that government and bank is "rational person" on the supply level. The paper based on complete information dynamic game to sets up a Stackerberg model between "government" and bank. And the article analyses three problems which "government credits, banks cooperate", "banks don't cooperate, government doesn't commit" and "government credits, banks don't cooperate" by model analysis and mathematical derivation. The ideal Nash equilibrium is made from research, it means "government credits, banks cooperate". But there is a reality that the plight of "banks don't choose to cooperate and government often doesn't choose to commit". How can we break the plight of reality? Article draws four policy suggestions to base on the dynamic consistency of policy. Firstly the government should restrict the own power to change government-bank fiscal relation. Secondly, retaining "less equalitarian" government official will help its strategic choice with optimal equilibrium. Thirdly, the government must be focused on its own "reputation" contribute to "commitment strategy". The last one is build up the "benevolent government" that motivate banks create more income.
Keywords/Search Tags:GSSL, effective supply, dynamic game, policy dynamic inconsistency
PDF Full Text Request
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