The Research On The Correlation Between The Executive Stock Option And The Corporate Performances Of Listed Companies In China

With the development of modern corporate system, The Principal-Agent Problem has been being the key of further perfecting the structure of property right and improving on corporation governance structure,which is the direct reason for the existence of Executive Stock Option and results in the"three-dimensional nature"of Executive Stock Option. Executive stock option makes its mechanism stereological and decides the circulation function of the ownership structure, salary system and executives of enterprise performance through its"three-dimensional nature". With the increasingly perfect modern enterprise system, the impact of the"3d nature"on the corporate governance structure and performance is increasingly clear, and most of researches on the Executive Stock Option in China are mostly from the point of Equity Incentive. Therefore, To carry out the research on the relationship between Executive Stock Option and Corporate Performances which is independent from Equity Incentive in the view of the"3d nature"of Executive Stock Option will be one of Important directions of the research on Executive Stock Option.On the basis of existing literature, the article illustrates the "3d nature"of Executive Stock Option and characteristics and work mechanism in the view of the corporate governance structure. On this basis, the article introduce the variable of company growth as the intermediate variable and use descriptive statistics, the correlation analysis and regression analysis to analyze the impact of the executive stock option on of the company performances by annual data of A-share listed companies which have being carried out the ESOs in the view of the"3d nature", and proposes some suggest to promote the development of ESOs from the point of corporate governance structure, financial environment and external environment.The article firstly proposes the"3d nature"of ESOs which is independent of the Equity Incentive, which define ESOs as an incentive and restrictive mechanism, a way of salary and a right of residual claim, then the article explains"3d characteristics"and the work mechanisms of ESOs. In the view of three-dimensional nature, the article use top executives shares, cash compensation shares, and the share concentration ratio as the measures of"3d nature"of ESOs, and use firm growth as the control variable to analyze the impact of the executive stock option on the company performances in the view of the "3d nature", which illustrates the significance of"3d nature"of ESOs and the effectiveness of three-dimensional mechanism.