Empirical Study On The Effect Of Ownership Structure Of Chinese B-share Listed Companies On Financial Risk

Joint-stock company is accompanied by the emergence of China's economic reform, many even gradually evolved by the former state-owned enterprises after the reform. After the ten years of development, although most companies have achieved satisfactory results, but it still exposes many problems, such as low operational efficiency, dissatisfactory business performance and so on. Therefore, strengthen the corporate governance structure and enhance the level of performance management become the company's current most pressing and urgent problems.Ownership structure is the basis for company management system, which determines the control of the company structure and internal governance institutions through the impact on the efficiency of corporate governance, which became a public company's important formed source of financial risk. The phenomenon of listed companies'irrational guarantee, excessive investment, substantial shareholders funds, and inappropriate related party transactions exist in China's stock market and become quite serious, which increased the instability of the financial situation, and led to financial risk.In this paper, it chose China's stock market listed companies which issued B shares as the research object, selected the relevant financial data of listed companies as samples, and revealed the impact caused by the different arrangements in ownership structure of listed companies on the financial risks through theoretical analysis and validating assumptions by empirical analysis. Through the research, we draw the following conclusions: the proportion of the state-owned shares of listed companies in the total share capital was significantly positively correlated with the level of financial risk, suggesting that state-owned shares "due to dominance" criticized by the same researchers seriously affect the listed company's Treatment efficiency; the proportion of tradable shares and the level of financial risk had significant negative correlation, indicating that it need to vigorously promote the split share structure reform ,and reduce the proportion of non-tradable shares and increase the proportion of outstanding shares until the realization of "circulation", will be able to optimize the market corporate governance structure and reduce the level of financial risk; managerial ownership and corporate financial risk were significantly negatively correlated, suggesting that the appropriate stake increase the importance of senior management, and the increase in shareholding must be able to play a management incentives; ownership concentration was negative correlated with financial risk, which indicated that large shareholders not only emptied listed companies, but also supported the listed companies appearing financial crisis; equity balance and corporate financial risk were significantly positive correlation, illustrating that the different perspectives of appropriate ownership concentration of listed companies is necessary to prevent from happening equity shareholders "vote with their feet" phenomenon cause by fragmentation.The main innovation of this paper is: sample selection. Most scholars of ownership structure or financial risk used to select the A-share listed companies as sample, while the paper to be adopted in the issue of B shares in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market listed company data as the main sample. It can be said that the study is an important support for the currently similar studies in A shares, made the research of the ownership structure to financial risk be more comprehensive, and the combination could better reflect the ownership structure of listed companies in the real situation.Through the research and analysis, this paper proposes the following recommendations: continue to reduce the proportion of state-owned shares to optimize the equity structure of listed companies; in order to prevent dominance, you can build a number of major shareholders controlling the composition of the main structure; continue to increase the proportion of outstanding shares; appropriately increase in the proportion of managerial ownership to motivate management to achieve more effectively maximize shareholder value.