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Research On Incentives And Supervisions Of Life Insurance Salesmen In China

Posted on:2012-02-18Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y FuFull Text:PDF
GTID:2219330362453861Subject:Business Administration
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
As the insurance market grows rapidly in China, the income from life insurance of our country has always been keeping the largest proportion of the whole country's total insurance premium. And the insurance premium which insurance salesmen created plays an important role in the whole premium of life insurance. In order to occupy regional markets of life insurance and increase the proportion of marketing, insurance salesmen inevitably become the objectives that a number of insurance companies pursue, in the meanwhile, the Incentives that insurance companies offer to salesmen have been keeping updating and improving.Due to the informative unbalance between insurance salesmen and insurance companies in the insurance transactions, and the difference of their respective fundamental benefit goals, sometimes for the purpose of maximizing the personal benefits, insurance salesmen will have the behaviors damaging the benefits of insurance companies in the sales process, and moral hazards will be generated consequently. This thesis starts with both incentives and supervisions. On one hand, the limitations of various incentive measures with which insurance companies provide insurance salesmen are studied, and on the other hand, the reasons that moral hazards will be generated are analyzed, as well as the types of moral hazard behaviors about insurance salesmen, and also that the rules of life insurance salesmen should be improved are indicated.The specific contents that this thesis researches mainly include: firstly, describing and summarizing the current situations, such as the development scales of life insurance salesmen , and the incentive and supervisory mechanism with which insurance companies provide salesmen, and also analyzing the problems that exist in it; secondly, by means of principal-agent theory, researching how insurance companies offer incentives to life insurance salesmen, and how the optimum supervisory mechanism will be established, which is the important part of the thesis; at last, making the relevant practical studies by means of the research findings that the previous articles have achieved.The renovations that this thesis archived are as following:1. Making research on personal agents of life insurance in our country, by means of principal-agent theory. Analyzing the potential risks that principal-agent rules will incur.2. Analyzing the demand point of the incentives to insurance salesmen. And using the demand point as entry point, analyzing the importance of the incentives to insurance salesmen, from practical points of view. Further, on the basis of current incentive measures of life insurance marketing, especially the motivational factors in Basic Law of insurance companies, specifying the positivity and limitation of the current incentive measures, and analyzing the corresponding reasons, on the basis of which the suggestions of improvements are come up with.3. Analyzing the factors that have influence on the establishment of effective supervisory systems. The gaming models between insurance companies and salesmen are established , indicating that insurance companies should strengthen more direct supervisions to salesmen, in the meanwhile clarifying the division of labor among the supervisory functionalities of three main regulation bodies, i.e. China Insurance Regulatory Commission, insurance companies and insurance industry association.
Keywords/Search Tags:insurance, salesman, motivation, supervision
PDF Full Text Request
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