Study On Economic Effect And Regulation Of Inter-industry Platform Cooperation

With competition among two-sided(or multi-sided) markets fierce day after day, inter-industry platform cooperation is becoming more and more common. However, what on earth internal causes of the phenomenon is and how a government should reasonably regulate the cooperation are all urgent questions which the theoretical circle of two-sided market must answer. To make a solution, not only can be beneficial for guidance on how to carry out inter-industry platform cooperation, and but also can be a help for richening modern industrial organization theory.Firstly,considering the fact that inter-industry platform cooperation improves users' intrinsic benefit, the paper constructs a duopoly competition model, which is the research base of analyzing platform cooperation; Secondly, based on the benchmark model by analyzing the economic effect of intra-industry platform cooperation, the paper confirms that platform enterprise do have economic effect of incentive deficiency,and naturally it draws out a discussion on another widespread platform cooperation mode—inter-industry platform cooperation; Thirdly, the paper analyzes economic effect of inter-industry platform cooperation with consumer single-homing and multi-homing, and then the paper also pointedly compares several economic effects of the two kinds of cooperation modes, at last it find out why inter-industry platform cooperation is so common in reality; Finally, combining with some cooperation cases of Bing platform, the paper gives a case analysis on the above mathematical conclusion, and by summing up the full text, the paper puts forward some policy suggestions on inter-industry platform cooperation.Based on the above analysis path, we find:(1) intra-industry platform cooperation can't increase the profit of the cooperation platform, so it is lack of incentives to undertake cooperative, but the cooperation mode can enhance the consumers'surplus and welfare of the whole society. (2) Under the case of single-homing, we find that as the cooperation effect is being improved gradually, this platform increases the price of users on the side generating weaker network externalities. But on the price of users on the other side, the result depends on the difference of network externalities between two user groups of the platform. About the Symmetry of pricing on the cooperation platform, we find that inter-industry platform cooperation aggravates the asymmetry of pricing on users of the two sides. And the conclusions are completely reverse on the non-cooperation platform. (3) Under the case of single-homing, Analysis on pricing shows that as the cooperation effect is being improved gradually, the platform increases prices of users on both sides. About the symmetry of pricing on the cooperation platform, we find that inter-industry platform cooperation aggravates the asymmetry of pricing on users of the two sides. But as to the non-cooperation platform, inter-industry platform cooperation drives prices on users of the two sides fall. But on the symmetry of pricing on the cooperation platform, the result depends on the difference between cooperation platform and non-cooperation platform on the single-homing side. (4) Different from intra-industry platform cooperation, inter-industry platform cooperation can have a negative impact on non-cooperation platform,it can also increase the profit of the cooperation platform, which shows that inter-industry platform cooperation has a strong incentive effect and also explains why this kind of cooperation is so common in reality. (5) inter-industry platform cooperation not only can expand user scale of cooperation platform, but also have an unfavorable impact on user scale of non-cooperation platform. (6) The paper also indicates that inter-industry platform cooperation may enhance the consumers' surplus and welfare of the whole society. This brings an important implication to the regulatory agency that it should be paid more and more attention to public polices on cooperation in two-sided market to avoid excessive interference.