Accounting Rent-seeking Research, Acquisitions Alienation

Today,our securities market is an emerging and transitional market. On the one hand, with the process of marketization the private enterprises are developing rapidly, while the capital bottleneck has always hindering the further development pace of private economy. Because of the restriction of the quota audit in capital market, forming their own fund-raising platform through the stock market is of urgent need for them. On the other hand, as the absence of the owners in china's state shareholding listed company, the property rights are empty, and the operating performances are bad. Then to introduce the new controlling shareholders, and on the basis of which to carry out the merger and acquisition (M&A) become a very urgent choice for them. The behavior of private enterprises to merger the state shareholding listed company is a special M&A between enterprises, and is a shortcut for indirect listing. The usual M & A behavior pursues a synergistic effect, but we can not deny that there is a dissimilation of M & A, which to make the revenue-maximizing through capital games for rent-seeking. Then the process of purchasing the control of state shareholding listed company permeates the shadow of rent-seeking. In the same time of seeking profiteering between the private enterprises purchaser and the state shareholding agent, the rent-seeking makes the investors a big loss instead of producing any economic value. According to the dissimilation of M&A, the private enterprise purchasers make the accounting rent-seeking in rent-seeking space , which cause the formation of rent in stock market and the big waste of social resources. Basis of this perspective, the paper applies the theory of the rational assumption of handlers and the rent-seeking to study the accounting rent-seeking in the dissimilation of M&A.In this text the research contents are different from the previous research. By the private enterprises merging the control of state shareholding listed company for sample, this text analyzes the accounting rent-seeking in dissimilation of M&A of the private enterprises merging the control of state shareholding listed company. First the text introduces the basic theory of accounting rent-seeking in the dissimilation of M&A, and analyzes the motivation of accounting rent-seeking. Then following the thread of the feasibility analysis of corporate control transfer---the pre-conditions for the dissimilation of M&A---the accounting rent and the influence factor , the text studies the rent-seeking mechanism between two parts in the dissimilation of M&A. and discusses the main realization way of accounting rent-seeking in dissimilation of M&A from two sides of before-and-after in M & A and reorganization. Last the text expounds this flow deeply by using cases. On the basis of the above study and analysis, according to the theory of accounting rent-seeking, keeping a foothold on the private enterprises merging the state shareholding listed company, this text proposes the countermeasures about reducing the choice for rent-seeking of state stockholder, and inhibiting the accounting rent-seeking of private enterprises purchasers. This paper hopes that the countermeasures would bring some positive reference meanings in maintaining a fair and just investment environment in stock market, in promoting the optimization of resource allocation and in stopping the waste of social resources.