The Study On The Ex-post Evaluation Of Antitrust Regulation For Concentration Of Undertakings

Although the antitrust regulation for Chinese concentration of undertakings is late, it has achieved certain results in antitrust enforcement principle, natural monopoly, excessive competition and administrative monopoly. At present, we also research the antitrust economic analysis for concentration of undertakings. But we have not yet pay attention to the evaluation of effectiveness of antitrust enforcement cases. As the first article for ex-post evaluation of the antitrust regulation of the concentration of undertakings in domestic, at first, this paper study the concept of ex-post evaluation:examination the effect of the antitrust regulation of the concentration of undertakings, the purpose of ex-post evaluation:finishing optimizing the decision-making process of antitrust authority about the antitrust regulation of the concentration of undertakings. The paper also introduces three methods for ex-post evaluation:structural models and simulations, evaluation methods, surveys and introduce their respective advantages and disadvantages. Secondly, this paper conducts ex-post study of 6 cases in Britain:Nutricia/Milupa, Cowie/British Bus, Technicolor/Metrocolor, Universal Foods/Pointing, CHC/Helicopter, NTL/Cable and Wireless, summarizing the experience of British antitrust regulation of the concentration of undertaking. We also take ex-post evaluation of 6 cases in United States:Union Pacific/South Pacific, Staples/Office Depot. Bell Atlantic/NYNEX, MCI WorldCom/Sprint, BP/ARCO, Heinz/Beech-Nut, obtaining the experience of the United States antitrust regulation of the concentration of undertakings. Thirdly, the author evaluate the Inbev-AB case which is the first released case since the implementation of Chinese antitrust law and Coca-Cola -Huiyuan case which is the first case prohibited by The Commerce Department.In the end, paper gets the conclusion:in order to ensure the accuracy of the decision-making process, the author suggests that should use a set of strict effectively analysis to competition restriction. At the basis of qualitative analysis, we should clear quantitative index in the market definition, market share and concentration, unilateral effect analysis, the more accurate quantitative analysis should be taken. According to the ex-post evaluation of Chinese case and the ex-post evaluation experience of American and British case, the article give some suggestions about how to perfect the process of antitrust regulation from the aspect of market definition and market concentration, anti-competitive effects, defending factors.In order to make examination process more accurate, our country shall be determined whether or not to make market definition, formulated well-defined standards to ensure which case should be taken market definition, what kind of case should be not taken market definition. For the cases which should be taken market definition, we should clearly define methods and standards. SSNIP analysis can be used to execute the assumption monopolies test. When we are examining the market power, the single market share index can't fully reflect the competitiveness of enterprise in the relevant market or the impact of a merger, so agencies should take advantage of market share, market concentration and other effective indicators to measure together. In the measure of market concentration, we shall establish quantitative standards of safe harbor rules. Not only should consider the market concentration, but also should be considered the change of the concentration degree as a result of the merger. When we analysis the anti-competition effect which caused by the concentration, agencies can construct economic model to quantitative unilateral effect. Can use the method of OFT and CC measure coordination effects, and in combination with the change of market concentration and analyzes market characteristic whether it helps collusion to assess the risk of coordination effects. Apply for concentration of operators generally offer defending factors to offset the effect of anti-competitive effects, the buyer power, entry, bankrupt, efficiency is the most common defending factors. In the course of examination, our authorities should explicitly formulate these defending factors. The enterprise has the responsibility of proofing. Only when the entry will satisfy the conditions of timeliness, likelihood, and sufficiency, only when the bankrupt can meet certain conditions, only when the efficiency is merger-specific can be considered the relevant defending factors.