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G.E.Moore’s Ethics Theory And The Consistency

Posted on:2014-01-20Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:W W ChengFull Text:PDF
GTID:2235330392462055Subject:Ethics
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This paper focus on the non-naturalism and the moral realism of G. E. Moore, anddiscusses the consistency of his ethics theory.The whole paper begins with two essential questions in ethics: one is whether thevalue can be reverted to facts, the other is whether there are moral facts. The answersof these two questions can distinguish naturalism with non-naturalism, moral realismwith anti-realism. Moore’s answer put him on the position of non-naturalism andmoral realism. Non-naturalism claims that value can not be reverted to facts, whilemoral realism claims that there are moral facts. One aims at cutting apart value withfact, while the other aims at linking these two parts. When they both show in onetheory, people will ask whether this theory is consistent or not. But Moore’s theory isconsistent, to understand his consistency, the distinguish between Moore’snon-naturalism and others should be understood first.According to “Principia Ethica” and “Ethics”, this paper discusses thenon-naturalism and the moral realism at length, and pays special attention to “thenaturalistic fallacy” and “the open question”. And the key of Moore’s consistency ishiding here.Non-naturalism is the key to understanding Moore’s consistency, and “thenaturalistic fallacy” is the key to understanding non-naturalism. This fallacy isabsolutely a strike to those who want to define good with facts, and makes it clearthat Moore is opposed to reverting value to facts. But why “the naturalistic fallacy” isa fallacy? It is not because of the differences between value and fact, but because ofthe nature of good itself. In Moore’s opinion, only complex can be defined, but good is not one of them. That is to say, Moore’s non-naturalism is not the same with theothers. He paid more attention to the undefinability of good itself than to thedifference between value and fact. This kind of non-naturalism does not cut apartvalue and fact, and correspondingly does not contradict the moral realism. That iswhy Moore’s theory is consistent.
Keywords/Search Tags:Moore, moral realism, non-naturalism, consistency
PDF Full Text Request
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