The Study Of The Local Government Behavior Of The Agricultural Land Requisition

With the rapid development of economy and the acceleration of the pace of new rural construction, since1980, our country local government suddenly has a great interest on rural land expropriation. There was different land expropriation that is in the name of public interest sprung up. It was called "the new enclosure movement". The phenomenon of our country’s land is expropriated is very outstanding. Some Concerned statistics show that, so far our country rural land expropriation has as many as390,000,000acres. It will not only lead the land resource of our country waste a lot, but also will have a large number of landless farmers emerged. This will has a serious impact on our country’s development of harmonious and stable society.So, this article mainly uses the method of combination of theory and practice, the aim is to make clear that there are irrational behavior and its roots of the local government in the land expropriation and to regulate it. The first chapter will describe the research background and significance, research status at home and aboard, and literature review, research ideas and methods, innovation and deficiency. The second chapter will give the concept about farm land, land expropriation and the behavior of local government. At the same time, this chapter will use the game theory, public choice theory, property right theory and the theoretical theory. The third chapter will use the He-Di village in Shanxi province as an example to tell the behavior of our country’s local government in the land expropriation. It mainly tells about the game process between the local government and the high level government and farmers. In the game process, in order to pursuit performance and self-profits, they will take the deceived and concealed reporting way. Meanwhile, governments of high level, their aim is to protect farmland and protect the farmers’basic interests. They will make sure the scale of expropriation of land in a certain field. In practice, local government usually enlarged this scales, they want to get great profits. In the game of peasant collective and local government, the fuzziness of farmers collective land ownership leads to the local government which directly became the owner of land. They connected with the peasant collective to buy and sell the farmland. In the game of farmers’profits, local government resorts to compulsion to take over the farmers’land. It badly damages the farmers’ vital interests and leads to a large number of farmers appealing to the higher authorities for help. The fourth chapter I will deeply analysis the unreasonable behavior of our local government in the land expropriation. I will find out the root from three aspects, they are local government itself, farmers and land expropriation system. The fifth chapter I will put forward the policy to regulate the behavior of our local government in land expropriation. I will combine the situation of abroad with the actual situation in our country. It is also from the local government itself, farmers and system the three aspects to put forward the policy to regulate the behavior of our local government in land expropriation.The innovation of this thesis lies in not only applying the macroscopic thinking, but also using the micro concrete examples. It will combine the two aspects organically, the theory with practice. In the basis of profound theory, there is no lack of vividness. This thesis tries to regulate and perfect the local government’s behavior in the process of rural land expropriation. According to it, I will make the conduct of research. So as to ensure the basic interests of farmers’land stimulate the society stable and harmonious development.