China’s Foreign Policy In Africa:Progress,Impacts And Challenges

China’s African foreign policy dates back in history and has changed in approaches, but hardly in principles. The pattern has been consistent in terms of historical milieu, such that it still embeds the fundamental principles.1However, due to changes in domestic conditions and the international environments, the approach and implementation swim with the tides:changing forms according to specific timelines due to these variable factors. In the1950s to1970s saw the focus of China’s African policy principally hinged on ’struggles’ for the preservation of sovereignty and independence of China as well as African countries. The winds of the Cold War blew perpendicular to the axis of periphery countries, leading to the formation of the non-aligned movements against imperialism of which China was in the fore front, a de-facto ’leader’ of the ’developing countries’, championing its own ideological construction. This featured from1980s to1990s, in which the policy focus was to prevent countries in Africa and South America from recognizing Taiwan.2As at2012China has successfully made progress in this political goal associated with its re-unification, as50countries in Africa acknowledge the one-China principle.From1990s and2001, the domestic situation in China transformed into a country undergoing modernization. Increasing energy demands from1990s outstripped domestic capacity. Pragmatism in foreign policy began to douse ideology as China encouraged the going-global strategy in search of energy security, materials and new markets. There are however, other broader long-term strategic interests related to political diplomacy; nevertheless, China’s over all foreign policy in Africa from2001to date is inherently driven by economic diplomacy.3Buttressed by extant analysts such as He Wenping,’China’s Africa policy transcends a mere quest for resources. Rather, to understand China’s Africa policies, it is critical to take a broader view that integrates China’s overall diplomatic strategic pursuits which focus on China’s global position, its striving for the sustainable development of its economy and need for political support on important global issues.’4The emerging picture shows ’three-pronged’ dimensions of China’s African policy:ⅰ. Part of a broader spectrum of China’s economic development-led foreign policyⅱ. Consolidation and projection of China’s linear model:part of its historical continuity, modern attraction, soft power, alternative approach to foreign relations and development approaches different from the western model.5ⅲ. Construction of a broader web of partners in the south-south relations to support China in other regional and global issues in terms of balance (as against confrontation) with the developed north-north divide.National interests, the structure of international or regional environments, the behaviours of other actors and competition in interdependence shape all foreign policy. Other states engaged in interdependence do in the cyclical process scheme for their interests and benefits, according to their capabilities and domestic situation.6In view of these factors, coupled with the problems of coordination and control in foreign policy implementation, rationality and pragmatism favoured the emergence of institution such as FOCAC to manage the forces of these complexities. At the most generic level, this relationship revolves around physical capital and economic development. Through competition in interdependence, geopolitical policies pass through foreign policies-all bent in influencing how much access to resources and markets in other societies is possible which, in turn, determines the level and profile of gathering, institutional making, productivity and distribution process. In the end goal, it is the capital that is being exchanged in the many transactions of economic and political relations.7But as already stated, complexities favoured institutionalization of FOCAC to coordinate and manage China’s African policy. At the bilateral level (state-to-state), China focuses on economic diplomacy and development issues while at the multilateral level (AU, FOCAC), dialogue concentrates on broad range of issues that focus on building political foundations, supports and frameworks to support and strengthen economic agreements, consolidate’friendship partnership’ as buffers against pressures and asymmetrical terms by western countries on certain global issues and other group regional affairs such as African Union being conceived as a political bloc allied with China in regional and global issues.8In other contexts, multilateral levels serve as south-south cooperation-strengthening a parallel deepening of trade, investment relations and approach to development that emphasizes a model based on major central role of the state.This shifting foreign policy approaches and strategies according to new realities are neither exclusive nor insulated as it is part of China’s emphasizes on building economic and political relations with both developing and developed countries. The published ’African Policy Paper’ in2006further affirms this position when it declares that "China-Africa traditional friendly relations face fresh opportunities under the new circumstances’’. Economic-led foreign policy diplomacy only reveals China’s shifting priority in pursuing interdependent relations in search of energy security, natural resources and promotion of its rise (or recovery) as a global power; projection of China’s dynamic attractions and model according to its own definition of’being a responsible stakeholder’ in regional and international affairs. This reproduces China’s progressing transformation that naturally connects with its rich history, civilization and model for the emergence of a world order.9The use of resources-for-infrastructural development agreements has been the pattern of its activities in African countries and this has been promoted in its narratives as reproducing continuing increase in development ability in these countries as well as in China in the much talked’win-win’. The foreign policy narratives such as in’expanding the scope of Africa’s growth-enhancing capacities, foreign investments and development model’is promoted with ’the China’s advantage’-[shown in its opposite direction with western model], a partnership based on mutual respect:no intervention in domestic political affairs and no-use of strings of conditionality.10Distribution of our case study view show these correlation between diplomatic efforts and economic development, featuring resources-for-infrastructural agreements and implementations in central Africa (Democratic Republic of Congo [Kinshasa]), south-western Africa (Angola), north-eastern Africa (Sudan/South Sudan) and western Africa (Nigeria)-in terms of bi-lateral frameworks, while at the multi-lateral dimensions, emphasis hinges on consolidating and managing the over-all relations, albeit, holistically.In the course of implementation of its African foreign policy, China faces grueling challenges such as its resort to extreme brinkmanship in the face of dilemmas:conflicts of national interests with the espoused fundamental principles embedded in the2006African Policy Paper. The interpretation of arms shipments to Sudan and Zimbabwe diminish the discourse on’peaceful rise, non-intervention and mutual respect’. Similar pattern featured the conflicting reports about efforts to separate government’s awareness of company’s arms shipment to Libya in2011.11Though this foreign policy behaviour is located in our theory, it stifles the basic principles and foundations of China’s foreign policy. China would also have to manage the diplomatic cards playing out in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean-a sea route where the bulk of its imports from Africa and Middle East passes. The increasing destabilization factors such as piracy, terrorism and patrol of western vessels along these sea routes perhaps might be veiled strategic extended campaigns to contain China by some other establishments.In the future, China’s dynamic impacts in Africa would continue to re-align the regional balance of power, in terms of its advantage and preferences among policy makers. The use of ’resources-for-infrastructural development’ agreements, and the over-all policy principles and approaches would continue to reproduce shifting preferences eastward.