Prevention And Control Of Risks Of Corruption Research Based On The Mechanism Design Theory

In the21st century, China achieved a greater strategic change in the process ofclean government construction. On the point of anti-corruption, China insists onaddressing both the symptoms and root causes, comprehensive treatment, taking bothpunitive and preventive measures and focusing on preventive approaches to establisha sound system for punishing and preventing corruption. This article studied the riskprevention and control of China’s corruption problem from the perspective ofmechanism design theory with the intention that China’s anti-corruption systembecomes more in line with the logic and law of the general system design. Themechanism design theory was created by Hurwicz and developed by economists suchas Maskin and Myerson. Mechanism design theory studies the ability to design amechanism (or system or rules) to achieve stated objectives under the conditions offree choices, voluntary exchange, incomplete information and decentralizeddecision-making.This article studies roles of the prevention and control system of risks of thecorruption in accelerating the economic development, safeguarding authorities ofCPC and government, and promoting the social harmony and stability. The preventionand control of risks of corruption is necessary and conducive to China’s economicdevelopment, safeguarding the authority of the government and the party’s prestige aswell as social harmony and stability. For corruption prevention and anti-corruption,the country has achieved some success, showing good situations of systematicgovernance and overall advance and has been gradually creating proper approacheswhich suits China’s situation to prevent corruption. Although China got someachievements, problems are also evident in the design of corruption prevention andcontrol mechanism such as the construction of clean government culture is hampered;the result of corruption prevention is not satisfied; the power supervision did not playits due role and the clean government system cannot be effectively implemented.Based on the mechanism design theory, this article discussed causes of these problemsin two aspects: the information efficiency and the incentive compatibility. In order tosolve problems in risk prevention and control of corruption and to achieve the goaland to effectively protect public and people’s interests, this article gives suggestionsand advices based on the theory of incentive compatibility and information efficiency as follows: implement the corruption risk management, improve andperfect the system of making government affairs public, establish the financialdisclosure system, reform the civil service pay system, adjust and reform theperformance evaluation criteria, reform and improve the power supervision systemand other countermeasures by learning from Singapore and Hong Kong’s advancedexperience.On the basis of items such as the basic theory of mechanism design, problems ofprevention and control of corruption risks, related experience at home and abroad, thepaper finally makes a conclusion as follows:1. The mechanism design theory isadaptable to the design of prevention and control system of corruption risks.2. Thereare still some problems existing in that system although some achievements have beenmade.3. China can learn from the related experience at home and abroad.4. The mixof theory and practice must be paid attention to in designing the prevention andcontrol system of corruption risks.