Real Estate Regulation And Control Of The Central Government And Local Government Interest Game Analysis

In all the aspects of social security, housing security has become a main thing which people concern most. In order to make the great ambition of setting up a harmonious society come true, the government has carried on a series of control measures, but the results are not good enough to decrease the price of the housing. This article based on the analysis for the surprising phenomenon, by setting up math models, mainly revealed why the housing price could not fall down and behind which there exists complex benefits relationships and each benefit group’s motivation.The main functions of the government are supplying the social managements and public products and services. Housing, as the first thing to guarantee people’s daily life, need the government’s effective managements. Therefore, controlling against excessively high housing price appears reasonable and logical.But there is always a little distance between the ambition and the reality. We can see that the previous control behaviors were not effective enough to make the house-pricing fall down. But it grew up faster and faster than before. Therefore the domestic and international scholars have launched a multi-level, three-dimensional study. Some scholars, by the comparison research method, reveal the Japanese real estate bubble rupture can reflect what China should do; Some think, by drawing lessons from developed country, levy property tax to stabilize prices; and some insist that we should learn from Singapore and the Nordic welfare state to build houses to guarantee people’s basic life, such as energetically building the economic application of the housing and low-rent-housing. Some experts focus on the research of the land finance mode and how it pushes up the price of the real estate in China. Some devote themselves to the research about government official’s seeking and creating rent. Others also use the historical comparative research method to study China’s housing system reform and development course. From different directions, different sides, and different depths of the development, these research subjects reveals the law of the development of the real estate industry of China and the role in which the government plays and what function it should have.This article, accidently based on above researches, using mathematical models of game theory and combined with the general theory of economics, reveals what is going on between the central government and the local government under the background of the high housing prices, from a new angle of view. Through using mathematical quantitative features, it reveals the correlation degrees between the various price regulation factors. In order to realize the goal of price control, some related variables need be optimized in priorities. Through quantitative analysis, the abstract of the real problem between related parameters is presented to the readers. It is the theoretical value which enriches and develops related research literatures of the real estate regulation.Facing with people’s increasingly complaining about the high housing-prices, in addition to reassuring people, senior officials of Chinese government carried on few infective measures indeed. Since the current policies is still not effective enough to make the goal of controlling the housing-price come true, it is very necessary to study the chaos of the real estate regulations thoroughly. Through using the game model of mathematics and combining the theory of interests of political science, it interoperates the chaos behind the current control of the real estate better.By using model to prove the chaos of the existing real estate control empirically, we have found the potential deep interests hidden in the control of the high price. We can say that China’s real estate development mechanism is a real big problem rather than that the real estate businessmen are profiteering capitalists. In the existing land finance mode, local governments like selling land most. They have almost become ones which make up shortage of finance and other financial expenditure with large amounts of revenue. As central government’s current control measures is opposite to the local government’s interests, expecting positive responses from local governments to the implementations of central government’s macro-control of the real estate is not realistic.In order to restrain the behaviors of local governments and make local governments get rid of the land finance mode, central government should introduce punishment mechanism in the assessment of local governments’officials. This paper will mainly apply the punishment mechanism model under the prisoner’s dilemma to the real estate macro-control measures. We are sure that the model is proved to be effective and significant.