Interests Under The Perspective Of The Villages And Towns Government Behavior Variation Analysis

At the bottom of the state administrative sequence, Township government is the peripheral nervous system of the state administrative organization and directly faces the rural grass-roots community. It bridges the rural population and higher level government organization or even social category in extended sense together.The particular and complex status determines its unique behavior logical and characteristics. The interest of township government’s objectives is highlighted in the midst of multiple gaming with other stakeholders in the ecology of grass-roots administrative, and all kinds of township government action variation are presented in practice. Therefore, it is of great significance to explore the variations. Against the backdrop of small town construction, this paper probes into the theoretical and practical value of analyzing township government acts from the starting point of general theory analysis and pointcut of interest perspective based on public choice theory and game theory. The paper also explores the fundamental thinking of township government action variation under interest perspective.From the analysis of the status quo the variation, this paper investigates the particularity of the township government’ administrative ecology in depth, analyze the multi-stakeholder framework for the game of primary administrative ecology and explore the construction space of township government under this situation. And then this paper analyzes the underlying causes of variation and provides certain policy recommendations.Chapter one is introduction. This chapter is about the background and significance of the study. It classifies the relevant studies at home and abroad and gives a brief comment on those studies. The research thoughts, methodology, innovation and limitation are also in this part. Start with the general theory of township government, chapter two explains township government’s standardization acts, roles and functions. This chapter also introduces the rationale of this paper, which are public choice theory and game theory. After the commenting of the existed perspectives of this field, this paper emphasizes the special academic value of interest perspective in researching township government acts. Based on the rationale introduced in the previous chapter,chapter three conducts a case study of A town, investigating the township acts variation in the process of construction and summing up the variation of pressure type, profit seeking type, malconformation of rights and responsibilities type and relationship differencial type. On the basis of the performance of its behavioral variation and current status of classification of this definition, chapter four expores the underlying causes of these behaviors and dissect factors which influence the township government behavior from the particularity of its special administrative ecology, public choice theory of "rational man" logic, the dilemma of double commissioned agent, the paradox of institutional logic, and paradox of supervision of logic, corresponding to the analysis of causes of variation, chapter five puts forward thoughts and countermeasures to standardize and optimize the behavior of the township government, expounding relevant countemeasures and suggestions about how to build resonable interests distribution pattern, regularize the functions of township government and let it play a effective role, build an open and orderly interests game mechanism, to improve the mechanism of performance appraisal, and improve the mechanism of binding interests. This chapter also intriduces some suggestions to correct the township government’s variation acts through balanceing interest relationship, improving public service capacity of township government, regulating the game program, and strengthening and guiding citizen participation, and then regulating and optimizing the township government behavior choices more efficiently.