Analysis On The Regulation Of Vertical Restrictive Agreements Under Anti-Monopoly Law In China

Vertical restrictive agreement is the agreement, decision or other concertedpractice between upstream and downstream enterprises, which eliminates or restrictscompetition. The event of the Mercedes-Benz price restraint in2011exposed theunspoken rules of the automotive industry to the public. Similarly, a consumer lawsuitwith Dong Feng Motor Company for monopoly management of its automobile spareparts in2010brought attention to expensive industry supply chains. These two newestevents relating to vertical restrictive agreements in automotive sales implicates thatthe vertical restrictive agreements between automotive manufacturers and distributors,and general agents and distributors, have seriously affected the development ofautomotive industry and harmed the interests of consumers. This thesis usesautomotive sales as the analysis perspective, takes legislation and related practice ofthe European Union for reference, analyzes the newest cases of automotive sales inChina, and uses the methods of comparative and empirical analysis to discuss theregulation of vertical restrictive agreement under Anti-monopoly Law in China withinthe following four chapters.The first chapter is the basic theory of vertical restrictive agreements. It definesthe legal definition of the vertical restrictive agreement, including its concept and forms, explains the definition of vertical restrictive agreement in the European Unionby cases, and conducts economic analysis of vertical restrictive agreement andsummarizes the opinions of different economic theories.The second chapter is the regulation of vertical restrictive agreements in theautomotive sector of the European Union. It introduces the current legal frame，transition of laws and regulations and the regulating principles, states the objects ofcompetition policy in the automotive sector and analyzes the modification of blockexemption regulation of vertical restrictive agreements in the European Unionautomotive sector. Taking the parallel trade restriction case of Volkswagen AG as atypical example, it analyzes the decision of the European Union Commission andverdicts of European courts, and conducts legal assessment of the key dispute issues.The third chapter sets forth the regulation of vertical restrictive agreements inChina. It introduces the sales volume, market concentration of automotive sales andthe4S brand sales model to describe the general situation of the automotive sales inChina. It analyzes vertical price restrictive agreements and vertical non-pricerestrictive agreements and corresponding regulation under anti-monopoly law. It alsocomments on the cases of the2011Mercedes-Benz price restraint and the2010DongFeng Motor Company monopoly on spare parts.The fourth chapter proposes suggestions on the regulation of vertical restrictiveagreements in automotive sales in China. It advocates the leading of the competitionpolicy in the relationship with industrial policy and suggests the changes of theImplement Rules on Management of Automotive Brand Sales. It also suggests theimplementation of regulations in the automotive sector, including the verification ofthe non-price vertical restrictive agreements and the block exceptions. In order tooptimize the channel of judicial relief, it presents the suggestions regarding thejudicial relief of the executive verification and private action.