Basic Research Of The Inculpation Of Actio Libera In Causa

Throughout the history of criminal law, since the theory of actio libera in causa wascreated, regarding its punishable basis, the judgment of implementation behavior’ time andexisting in which kind of offences have been a focus among scholars in criminal law field. Allmodern countries implement responsibility principle, according to its requirements, if thestate prosecutes criminal responsibility of offenders, the prerequisites are that offendersshould be equipped with the ability of criminal responsibility and he or she commits the actthat threat or infringed on legal profits which criminal law protects is base on subjective faultof intent or fault. If he or she has no or limited ability of criminal responsibility when theoffender commits this act, then criminal law should exempt from or alleviate his or herpunishment, which is the embodiment of “the co-existing of responsibility ability andimplementation action”. The dominating content of the principal is the actor equipped withcomplete or limited ability of criminal responsibility when he or she commits acts thatinfringe on legal interest. However, there are following situations in reality: the offender putsherself or himself into the condition of criminal incapacity based on intent or fault andcommits acts damage legal interest in this situation, whose object is that separatesresponsibility ability and implementation action, then avoids the principal of “the co-existingof responsibility ability and implementation action”, drunk crime is just typical example under this condition. Before the theory of liberal action in reason is presented, if thegovernment executed strictly the theory then the offence was exempted from or alleviated,therefore scholars in civil law system put forward the theory of liberal action in reason whoseobject is that sanctions the criminal act avoided criminal law. According to the theory of actiolibera in causa, the offender has no responsibility ability when he or she starts to commit act,but due to the offender’s own reason so that she or he falls into the situation of responsibilityincapacity. However, he or she had liberal will and responsibility ability before he or shesuffers from “illiberality”, therefore criminal law is able to punish this act.Recently, the discussions regarding self-falling into incapability and limited criminalresponsibility and take drunk crime as typical representation is increasing among criminalscholars in our country. Until “the8thamendment of criminal law” put dunk crime intocriminal law, the debate about drunken crime is increasingly sparkly. On the one hand, ournation lacks particular and perfect regulations related to dunk crime and similar crime, whichcontains judicial circle in objective to try and sanction this kind of crime systematicallyaccording to the principal of legality; On the other hand, there is still no any unanimousconclusion about the theory of actio libera in causa among scholars both in our country and inalien nations, then limiting our nation to make detailed criminal articles according to thistheory. Due to this current situation, the paper discusses the theory of actio libera in causafrom various perspectives then hopes to make more or less contribution in associated theoretical field in China.The paper is divided into four parts in total:Section one: introducing the definition and structural features of actio libera in causa. Itsstructural characteristics include three aspects: Firstly, separating responsibility ability and theact that damages legal interest. Secondly, setting act according to reason is equipped withculpability. Thirdly, limited criminal responsibility ability and criminal responsibilityincapability are temporary.Section two: conforming the fact that the actor should be equipped with predictablypossibility to harms instead of just predict himself or herself to fall into the dilemma that he orshe without or has limited criminal responsibility ability. Basing on above facts, it putsforward the possibility of prediction for the offender should judge according to the amount ofempirical experience. The paper further classifies actio libera in causa: according tosecond-hand experience, the possibility that the actor commit harmful acts when he or she hasno or limited criminal responsibility ability is huge, which is actio libera in causa. If the act iscommitted by chance, according to experience, individuals hardly have possibility to predictthe actor to commit harmful act when he or she has no or limited criminal responsibilityability, which is not belong to the scope of actio libera in causa.Section three: the paper explores the culpability of actio libera in causa from threeaspects included implementation action and its starting, the definition of responsibility ability and the penetrability of crime object. Basing these basic concepts and related legalprincipals, taking the generation of harmful results as starting point and evaluate whether theconditions suited to actio libera in causa is culpable from the perspective of criminal empiricalexperience, then to construct the theoretical fundament of culpability for actio libera in causa.Section four: conclusion.The conclusions of the paper are: to begin with, when the actor in the phase of setting actaccording to reasons can predict his or her act that will be committed harm specific legalinterest, which is actio libera in causa. As for the actor cannot predict it and he or she justpredicts him or him will fall into the condition of criminal incapability or limited criminalresponsibility ability, which is not the liberal action in reason. Moreover, the paperretrospectively evaluates the acts that take the generation of harmful results as starting point.As for under the occasion of indirect intent and fault, when the harmful results happen inreality, we put setting action according to reason into implementation action; Under theoccasion of direct intent, when harmful results occur or legal interest is really threatened, weput setting action according to reason into implementation action to fit the basic principal of“the co-existing of responsibility ability and implementation action” then constructing thefoundation of culpability.