The Conflict Between Judicial Intervention In Corporate Governance And Private Law Autonomy

Corporate autonomy is an extension of the autonomy of private law in the commercial sphere, tend to emphasize the autonomy of private law civil entities engaged in the field of private law in all civil acts are represented in accordance with its meaning and is not subject to the interference of others. As natural persons, corporate have independent legal persons and the right to enjoy civil and commercial matters and to assume the obligations and responsibilities of the Civil and Commercial Matters. However, the corporate legal qualification cannot abuse the exercise of their rights not only by the adjustment of the basic principles of the Civil Code, but also by the Companies Act and a series of commercial legal norms adjustment, especially public corporation, such as listed companies, its corporate governance conditions subject to the supervision of stakeholders, such as in the annual report is often essential to disclose the status of its corporate governance.Traditional corporate governance emphasizes the conflict of interest between the owners and management of the balance of corporate governance, but in China is a conflict of interest between the balance controlling shareholder of the Company and its minority shareholders. In this paper, with the development of corporate governance practice, trying to draw on the basis of previous studies to study the theory and practice of corporate governance in the conflict and balance of judicial intervention and the autonomy of private law from the corporate governance process.The paper is divided into four chapters, the first chapter is a foreshadowing of the theory of corporate governance and judicial autonomy, main introduces the domestic field of company law in China has formed the conclusion of the theory, such as corporate autonomy theory, the theory of corporate personality, equity and theory of property rights and corporate governance well-known principal-agent theory, the modern theory of the firm. The second chapter specifically addressed domestic and foreign judicial intervention in corporate governance research status, including the scholars of the Act on the development of the theoretical study of traditional corporate governance and corporate governance-autonomy from the company to the limited intervention of the judiciary on corporate governance in two parts. Chapter three is the reasonable analysis of the corporate governance of the judicial intervention in favor of judicial intervention in corporate governance reasons for and against judicial intervention in corporate governance reasons, both positive and negative aspects, followed by the different categories of judicial intervention on corporate governance and the impact of corporate autonomy, combined with practice on the basis of comparative analysis, should pay attention to the problem of judicial intervention in corporate governance. The final chapter reproduces the shortcoming of corporate governance in China by the way of illustration, discusses the limits of judicial intervention in corporate governance and autonomy to solve the problem, and China’s company law and corporate governance status quo some personal opinion and recommendations. In my humble opinion, the innovation is the combination of real examples in solution problems and distinguishes between public corporation and close corporation.