| This paper makes deep study from the following points: how to solve the problem ofthe listed company’s free cash flow, how to regulate the cash dividend of listedcompanies, improve the efficiency of corporate governance and reduce agency costs.Based on principal-agent theory, control of the residual rights theory and convergenceof interests and entrenched stick effect theory, this paper tries to solve the agencyproblem between shareholders and the management of listed companies through thestudy the relationship between managerial ownership and cash dividends, increasingmanagerial ownership will combine the interests of the shareholders and the interestsof management, reduce agency costs and improve the role of agent efficiency.According to the analysis of this paper, we used listed companies in Shanghai andShenzhen from2006to2010as samples, excluding irrelevant data, then usesdescriptive statistics and multiple linear regression and other empirical methods tostudy the following conclusions. The study concluded that:(1) the proportion ofmanagerial ownership and the allocation cash dividends of listed companies has apositive correlation, but the result is not significant, which has a great relationshipwith low management stake in China and the imperfections of corporate governancestructure;(2) management ownership of listed companies, state-holding enterprisesmore inclined to cash dividends;(3) On the basis of the former conclusions of thestate-controlled listed companies that could conducted further research and found thatthe proportion of managerial ownership and cash dividend significant positivecorrelation at the0.05level, this result also reflects the management holding shares forthe degree of agency costs of state-controlled listed companies. Based on the findings,this paper makes analysis from the macro and micro level and put forward relevantproposals in the capital market system and corporate governance structure. |
PDF Full Text Request