Equity Incentives, Bank Debt Constraints, Private Benefits Of Control And Managers’ Over-investment Behaviors Of State Holding Listed Companies In China

As the world’s largest emerging economy, china’ market economy started later andcapital market development is not mature. There is very big difference compared toforeign mature market economy, and as the pillar of the national economy and economicparticipation body-the state holding listed companies, there are many different corporategovernance problems from the developed countries. On the one hand, the internalmanagement structure is flawed. State-owned holding listed companies mostlyrestructured from the state-owned enterprises or government departments, state-ownedshares of the “Domination of a Single Shareholder”, state-owned shareholders’“absenceof owner”, and the administrative atmosphere is strong, the internal management structureis similar to modern company system but not like. On the other hand, exterior governanceis not sound. Our country’s market economy changed from the planned economy, so themarket economy development start later, capital market is not sound, such as the stockmarket and securities market. But these two aspects of corporate governance problemswill eventually reflect in the economic efficiency. So the research of our countrystate-owned holding listed companies investment behavior has important theoretical andpractical significance. Such as guarantee the national economy social investmentefficiency, economize the resources and improve the utilization rate of energy funds toinsure the healthy and stable development of the national economy.This paper main research work basically has the following aspects:Use the state-owned listed companies and their investment relevant data in Chinasince2008, firstly, to analyzes our country state-owned holding listed companiesover-investment background and factors; Secondly, establishing the theoretical analysismodel, building and deducing the model, and on this basis to analyzes the model’seconomic significance; Finally, on the basis of the above, establish empirical researchmodel to empirical analysis and analyzes the economic significance of it.This paper’s mainly innovation embodies as the following aspects:This paper is on the basis of the current related research results, taking state holdinglisted companies of our country as backgrounds, under the hypotheses condition thatmanagers have the equity incentives and private benefits of control and have options ofequity financing and bank debt financing in the project financing decisions, this paper setsup appropriate mathematical and empirical research model, in theory and practice to research the effect mechanism of equity incentives, bank debt constraints and privatebenefits of control on managers’ over-investment behaviors of China’s state holding listedcompanies theoretically. And on this basis to reasonably explain our country state-ownedholding listed companies excessive investment behavior.From the theory study results show that, over-investment behaviors of China’s stateholding listed companies would increase in private benefits of control and decrease inmanagers’ shareholding percentage and bank debts.The empirical results show that the enterprise operator owns company control-rightdoes not necessarily affect the company operator’s excessive investment behavior; Forbusiness operators, equity incentives have inhibition to excessive investment behavior,but not significant; and the bank debt is basically intensifies the company operator’sexcessive investment behavior.