The Influence Of Ownership Structure On Corporate Performance In China’s Small And Medium-sized Enterprise Board

As a kind of active and good prospects corporate in market economy,the small and medium-sized enterprises(SMEs) play an irreplaceable role in the development of economy,which is the main driver of economic growth,an important force for technological innovation,and the main way to provide employment.However,the external financing constraints and inadequate internal corporate governance structure are the bottlenecks of the development of SMEs.The SME board has run for six years, although it has a very important strategic significance for the SME’s expanding of direct financing channels,the irrational ownership structure is still the main reason that constraints the SME’s healthy development and its improved performance.Therefore, this research on ownership structure’s effect on the corporate performance of the SME board listed companies has both theoretical and practical value.On the basis of full understanding of characteristics of ownership structure and corporate performance on the SME board,this paper selects 258 listed companies in the SME board,which has listed between 2004 and 2008 as empirical subjects, and chooses the total return on assets (ROA) and the main business service profit margin (MBSPM) as indicators of company performance,then analyses the relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance from the ownership constitution aspect and ownership concentration aspect separately.The study finds that the proportion of state-owned shares and outstanding shares,the proportion of the largest shareholder have a U-type relationship with corporate performance;the proportion of corporation shares has no significant correlation with the company performance;the managerial ownership and the corporate performance has a cubic relationship;and the Z index is negatively correlated with the corporate performance.Therefore,listed companies on SME board in China should treat state-owned shares differently.We should establish an effective control mechanism to bind the behavior of corporation shares,actively implement the country’s share reform policies and gradually increase the proportion of outstanding shares,use managerial ownership rationally to give full play to the incentive effect of managerial ownership,and we also should improve the equity checks in order to build balanced type of ownership structure.