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The Behavior Of Rural Micro-credit Supply And Demand Sides Incomplete Information Game

Posted on:2013-08-05Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y J WangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2249330371976952Subject:Finance
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
The Micro-credit, after the initial stages of the project operator by donated funds, in the field of rural finance is becoming more and more important. Coverage is high and the goal of sustainable development has gradually reached. In many developing countries, poverty is no longer the only focus of Rural Micro-credit, but to account for the majority of low-income persons to provide a full range of financial services. Indeed,that Micro-Credit to improve the lives of low-income people, support small and micro enterprises to grow, particularly by providing effective financial support is conducive to building a harmonious society.Rural Micro-Credit’s demand bodies are farmers and rural business enterprises. Now because China’s financial repression phenomena more serious in the farmers, generally farmers’ savings deposit requirements can be satisfied, so this article focuses on farmers’ credit problem. China’s rural microfinance has a huge market demand, and supply is a serious imbalance.Considering the so many participants, the power of non-equilibrium, incomplete information, that’s difficult to achieve perfect information and perfect competition in China Rural Micro-Credit market. Interest rates as the price of money as a special form of capital supply and demand changes in the various rural and can not form the parameters of the price with highly abstract and consistency. Their participant have one complex and dynamic relationship, they have been the overall impact, but also affect by the overall. So general static partial equilibrium analysis not a good idea. The introductions of game theory, in large part explain a variety of rational and multiple effects of thinking rural microcredit market. The participants of the game for its own interest, and embody the supply and demand for both parties not complete information dynamic game relationship.Article Six Parts:The first section discusses the meaning of rural microcredit, background and significance; The Part through the description of rural microfinance in China the main behavior of main body, between the game relations are defined. The game theory method, provides the research of rural microfinance in China the new ideas and new ways to solve the problem; The third part of the foreign microfinance development model, international microfinance development and Its Enlightenment to our country in these two areas, a comprehensive description of the international microfinance development status; The fourth part based on microfinance Game Analysis of the behavior of both sides of supply and demand with Helpful for our country rural microcredit continuous development Suggestions; The fifth part points out the theoretical and practical significance. The fourth part and the fifth part building in the third part’s conclusions.
Keywords/Search Tags:rural micro-credit, supervision game, relationship, incompleteinformation
PDF Full Text Request
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