Study On The Protection Of The Interests Of The Founding Shareholders During The Socialization Process Of Family Enterprises Based On The Analysis Of The Case Of Competition For Control Of GOME Group

In recent years, with the rapid development of Chinese capital market, many competitive family businesses are opt to be launched into the market in order to become more competitive and stronger. In this way, they are on a path of being socialized and become a public enterprise. Considering the fact that family enterprises are usually characterized with such defaults as nepotism and lack of talents, Chinese family enterprises have to overcome such defaults and introduce external intelligence capital, and break the traditional family-oriented recruiting modes. Therefore, it becomes inevitable to introduce professional manager into family businesses. So far some enterprises have taken this path, yet they are encountered with many obstacles after the first step. There are many reasons to arouse such phenomena such as professional manager’s poor ethic, lack of encouragement methods and restriction system.The case of GOME is a vivid representation of entrusted agent problem in family enterprises. In nowadays, more and more family enterprises are endeavoring to launch into market, and they will inevitably encounter such problems as GOME to some extent. The thesis penetrates into GOME case, and conducts analysis on the background, reason, process and result of this case, as well as lessons drawn from it. On the basis of discussing the problem of entrusted agent and Successful practices of BAIDU, Skyworth and New Hope Group, it tries to analyze the general situation by analyzing GOME case in order to figure out effective methods to protect the shareholders’ interests.