Central Government And Local Government Adjust To Control A Medium Game Problem A Research In The Real Estate Market

In recent years, China’s real estate market, there has been serious speculation, irrational price increases, housing supply structure is not balanced, the real estate market is not standardized and so on. To China’s national economy and people’s lives a lot of instability, thus affecting the sustained and stable economic development of the potential threat. To address these outstanding issues, the central government and relevant departments have been put forward a series of regulatory policy, expect the real estate market nationwide macroeconomic regulation and control. But so far, the implementation of these policies and the implementation of the results are not satisfactory.Based on this background, I selected the central government and local governments for the study, the interests of the game from the perspective of a study. This paper attempts to analyze the interests of the game, the central and local governments to identify the source of the game, as well as the factors that affect the game results.This paper from the central and local power and interest starting to explore the central government and local government the reason the game. Then the status quo in China’s real estate market, the analysis of the central and local government regulation of real estate interests and goals in the behavioral differences, and through the establishment of game model to analyze the central and local governments in the game under different circumstances, and analyze the impact of game results and game results fail to factor in the Pareto optimal reasons. Finally, the relationship between central and local building, real estate has been on improving the thinking and recommendations.