Research On The Approaches To Improve The Efficiency Of The Board Governance Of SOEs

In the economical globalization time, the market competitive capability of the native leading company manifests this country’s economic potentiality and the national competitive power. In China, the State-Owned Enterprises (hereinafter referred to as the SOEs), as the foundation and key factor of national economy, whose competitive capability has a direct bearing on the development of the national economy and the comprehensive national strength. At current, as the separation of ownership and management of enterprise, the corporate governance, with The Board of Directors (hereinafter referred to as the Board) as a core, specially the effectiveness of the Board, decides the sustainable development of enterprises. The system of the Board has been introduced to China for only a short time, especially into SOEs, nonetheless, it has played an important role to accelerate the foundation and improvement of the modern enterprise system. However, due to the influences of the property rights structure and traditional management concept of SOEs, the Board also has various imperfections and limitations, even in some SOEs, the Board is only existed nominally to be in accordance with all relevant national laws and regulations, and can not play its effective role in practice. Therefore, in the present period of the speeding up the standardization and promotion of the system of the Board, it has the vital significance in the theory and in the application to study how to improve the efficiency of the Board of SOEs.This article, with the relative theories of board governance, referring to the practical experiences of domestic and abroad Board operation, and with the application of the standard analysis and case analysis methods, takes the operation of the subordinate companies’ Board as a case (subordinate to China Guangdong Nuclear Power Holding Co., Ltd.(CGN) which is in the first batch of construction standard board of directors announced by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council in2010) and systematically analyses the external and internal factors to influence the efficiency of the Board, points out the present situation and major imperfections of the Board operation, and proposes the specific measures to improve the efficiency of the Board. Based on the domestic multitudinous research of the State-owned Assets supervision system and governance of modern SOEs, this article studies in depth the Board operation of the of CGN’s subsidiaries. The studies shows the Board, although has complete and innovation operation system, has imperfections in authorization, the directors cultivation, the multistage board cohesion and governance environment etc. In view of the above existed imperfections, this article puts forward the proposals for the scale and structure of the Board, the cultivation and allocation of the directors, the authorization of the Board and the handling of the economic and administrative governance. These study conclusions have certain guidance value to improve the efficiency of the Board governance of SOE’s.This article has its limit coverage in the study of efficiency of the Board governance with only choosing the subsidiaries of one SOE as study cases. At present, the shareholding reform of SOEs is a general orientation, the efficiency of the Board governance of the joint stock system must be further studied.