The Empirical Research Of The Influence Of Listed Companies’ Quality Of Information Disclosure On The Efficiency Of Investment

Information economics think, imperfect information and asymmetric distribution isnormal in the real world. Under asymmetric information, the inefficiency of stockmarket must be existed. The foreign Mature capital markets theoretical and empiricalresults show that high-quality information disclosure can alleviate the conflict ofinformation requirements between the company and outside investors, improveinvestment efficiency. Domestic scholars measure the quality of accounting informationusing mandatory disclosure indicators and the accounting empirical research supportedthe view that the high quality of accounting information can improve the companies’investment efficiency, but these studies ignored the role of the quality of voluntaryinformation disclosure on the investment efficiency, to a certain extent, which affectedthe results of the comprehensive. How the comprehensive quality of the voluntary andmandatory disclosure of information affect investment efficiency remains to beinvestigated. To optimize investment decisions of listed companies in China, theresearch based on this view has important theoretical and practical significance.In order to solve the problem that has been put forward. First, this papertheoretically analyzes Chinese listed companies’ problem of asymmetric informationand agency conflicts, putting forward the underlying assumptions. Then, Based ontheoretical analysis and assumptions, in the empirical testing, this paper use evaluationinformation results of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange to measure listed companies’comprehensive quality of information disclosure which include voluntary andmandatory information disclosure, using Richardson model to measure investmentefficiency, study how the voluntary and mandatory information disclosure worktogether to affect investment efficiency. The results show that the higher quality ofinformation disclosure, the less under-investment; if companies face the shareholderownership concentration is lower, the agency conflicts between shareholders andcreditors is more serious, but the quality of information disclosure is higher, it caninhibit the company’s inefficient investment more effectively.At last, putting forward the relevant recommendation: First, establish a soundcorporate governance structure; Second, strengthen the external audit supervision toinformation disclosure; Third, accelerate the construction of laws and regulations in thesecurities market.