The Empirical Studies Of Shareholding Structure Affect Internal Control Information Disclosure

In the beginning of the21st century, a series of financial fraud scandals broke out in the foreign stock market. Many scandals involved the false information of accountants and the deception of companies’high-level management. The scandals have induced doubts among investors about the effectiveness of internal control in listed companies and the authenticity of information disclosure. The same affairs have taken place in China, which make more and more investors begin to realize that the investment value of listed companies represent itself by the completeness, rationality and effectiveness of the internal control system as well as fine operating performance and development prospects. Therefore the internal control information disclosure of listed companies is increasingly drawing the attention of investors.Over recent years, though China has made some achievements in the internal control information disclosure through its unremitting efforts, there is still an obvious gap between China and some developed countries. Some related regulations shall be improved, the one of which concerns the investors-highly-focused problem whether the internal control can be effectively implemented. Then it will depend on the internal control intormation disclosure to reflect the fact. The quality of the internal control information disclosure will directly affect the result whether investors can get access to the real information of listed companies. In the thesis, it is believed that the administrative structure re of a company decides the behavior orientation of its managers, further affects the degree to which its internal control information is to be disclosed. As the foundation of property rights of a company’s administrative structure, shareholding structure intensively reflects rights and obligations of stakeholders and determines the company’s control right configuration and functioning methods of administrative mechanism. The suitable shareholding structure can improve the company’s administrative structure and internal control so as to increase the company’s values. Besides, an over-all, effective and faithful internal control can better reflect the problem in the company’s administrative management and refine the supervision of shareholding structure.Therefore the thesis studies the relationship between the shareholding structure of China’s listed companies and the quality of internal control information disclosure from the perspective of existing shareholding structure in order to present some suggestions about the improvement in the quality of internal control information disclosure and the current company shareholding structure. As to the structure of the thesis, firstly the influence on internal control information disclosure from shareholding structure and the relation between the both are to be analyzed based on related basic theories. Secondly, hypotheses are to be addressed according to the factors from which internal control information disclosure is affected by shareholding structure after the analysis of theories. Lastly, the further analysis is to be made and the conclusion is to be drawn in the basis of the empirical results combining the real situation in the China’s market, and the suitable strategic suggestions are to be put forward.