Ownership Property, Governance Characteristics And R&D Investment

From China’s R&D expenditure of previous years, the enterprise R&D activity hasbecome the main role of research and development. R&D input makes a growth year by year,but compared with the developed countries, the enterprise R&D input in China is still veryweak. Because R&D activities mean high risks, uncertainties and confidentiality, etc. R&Dactivities are companied by serious agent problem. Corporate governance is deemed to be aneffective method to solve the agent problem, and equity properties exert subtle influence inshareholders’ supervision and decision making. So in this paper the writer tries to make aresearch from the ownership property and features of enterprise governance.This paper’s theory analysis mainly based on the agency theory, thus may shine somelight on the analysis on the way which equity properties and governance features exertinfluence of R&D, and help raise assumptions of this paper. The writer mainly use theempirical method, and collect data for empirical test, this paper analyzes different governancefactors, equity nature and its moderating effect over institutional investors, institutionalinvestors’ influence on the R&D intensity, and also examines the moderating effect betweenseparated CEO and director and state-owned equity. In addition, this paper also make furtherexploration by creating different group by equity nature and institutional investors.The empirical study found that equity properties, institutional investors, equity structurearrangement, board governance features and senior management characteristics exertssignificant impact on R&D activities. State-owned equity and R&D input shows a significantnegative correlation; Institutional investor has an overall positive impact on R&D investment;Pressure-resistance institutional investors and pressure-sensitive institutional investors’impact on R&D significantly differentiated; Positive institutional investors and negativeinstitutional investors influence the R&D in a totally opposite way; Leadership structurewhich CEO and chairman’s separation can effectively reduce the state-owned controlling’snegative impact over R&D; The age and tenure of the executives and R&D input have asignificant negative correlation; Executive education and executives shareholding and R&Dinput have a significant positive correlation.This paper’s innovation mainly lies in: 1, Examines the moderating effect of state equity over institutional investors. Thepositive effect of institutional investor is stronger when the company is not a state-owned one.2, Inspected influence of different types of institutional investors over R&D input, usequantitative and qualitative methods to differentiate different investors. Examines varyinfluence on R&D under state-own and non-state own samples.3, Examine the moderating effect of leadership structure on the negative effect ofstate-own property over R&D intensity. The cross item of leadership structure and statecontrol is significantly positive which means the separation of CEO and Chairman in a stateown company has a positive impact on R&D.