An Empirical Study Of Institutional Shareholding’s Influence On The Tunneling Behaviors Of Controlling Shareholders

With the constant development and improvement of the capital market, the phenomena that the controlling shareholders of listed companies in China encroach on the interests of minority stock holders seriously by tunneling company’s assets and profit, has already got the extensive concerns of the academia, listed companies and supervision department. The existing evidence has already proved the tunneling phenomena that the controlling shareholders of listed companies in China. However, could restrain the holding big shareholder from "drawing still department of the research on whether the shareholding of institutional investors can hold back the tunneling behaviors of the controlling shareholders or not is still uncommon. Therefore, this thesis regards the listed companies of main board market in China as samples, carries on the experiential research to this question with multiple linear regression analysis model.On the basis of reviewing the relevant theories and practice about he institutional investor and tunneling behaviors of the controlling shareholders in an all-round way, this thesis proposes the hypothesis and research model, defined the relevant variables, and use SPSS statistical software to carry on descriptive statistical analysis, correlating analysis and regression analysis to the samples and the variables, examine the influence of the shareholding of institutional investors on the tunneling behaviors of the controlling shareholders, and provided the suggestion to optimize the governing structure of Chinese listed company.The study results have shown that, there is a "U" relation between the shareholding percentage of institutional investors and the tunneling behaviors of the controlling shareholders. They are negative correlation when there is low shareholding percentage of institutional investors; they are positive correlation when there is high shareholding percentage of institutional investors.Morever, there is a remarkable difference in the suppressing function of institutional investors with different natures to the tunneling behaviors of the controlling shareholders. Different institutional investors are different in a great deal of respects such as assets classes, capital source, debt characteristics, investment deadline, trusting request, target partiality, behavior mode, shareholding cycle,etc. which leads the remarkable difference in the suppressing function of institutional investors with different natures to the tunneling behaviors of the controlling shareholders.