Research On The Principal-agent Mechanism Of Venture Capital Guiding Funds Based On Complex Multi-tasks

Under the guidance of the "Innovation Country" Construction Strategy, in orderto support the rapid development of small and medium-sized enterprises which are themain bodies of technical innovation and play the lever amplification effect of fiscalfunds, our country begins to set up venture capital guiding funds with the source offiscal funds. After several years of operation, the venture capital guiding fundsachieve good results. However, with the development of venture capital guiding funds,more and more problems should be settled urgently. For example, the operation mainbody of venture capital guiding funds has obviously administrative color ininvestment decision-making and is short of operation ability; there are much morecomplex principal-agent problems than the traditional commercial venture capital; theparties have conflict targets and so on. How to organize and manage the venturecapital guiding funds and improve efficiency is main task of our government. Underthese circumstances, to analyze the complex principal-agent relationship and theparties’ behavioral characteristics, to do the research of venture capital guidingfunds operation mechanism in the situation of our country government have greatsignificance.With venture capital guiding funds as the research object, this thesis try toanalyze multiple principal-agent relationship and complexity characteristics betweenall the parties based on Complexity Science, Complex Systems, Principal-agentTheory and Common Agency Theory with the integrated methods of theoretical study,model, empirical analysis.This thesis firstly proposes to apply Complexity Scienceand Complex Systems to the research of venture capital guiding funds and putsforward to the concept of venture capital guiding funds principal-agent system.Detailly, the thesis constructs venture capital guiding funds internal managementprincipal-agent model and mechanism, and with which puts forward proposals aboutcurrent guiding funds management mode. Apart from that, the thesis constructsmulti-tasks venture capital institutions principal-agent model and mechanism based onthe perspective of venture capital guiding funds principal-agent system. At last, thethesis takes the venture capital guiding funds of Zhejiang Province for example to provide theoretical support for actual operations.Through the research, this thesis obtained the following findings andconclusions.(1)Based on Complexity science and Complex systems, the thesis points out thatventure capital guiding funds have the characters of integrity, multiplicity, openness,dynamic adaptability, self organization, and are venture capital guiding fundsprincipal-agent systems. More detailly, the venture capital guiding fundsprincipal-agent systems have the following characteristics: The systems’s nodeelements are government, guiding funds management agency, social investors,venture capital institutions and entrepreneurs, which are indispensable; node elementsare connected by complex principal-agent relationship; the systems pay attention toachieve the overall goal and focus on the benefits of the system and all the nodeelements should choose rational behavior to achieve the systems’s overall goal----topromote high-tech industry and small and medium-sized enterprises development; thesystems can react to the outside world changes with dynamic adaptability and selforganization.(2)Under the ground of venture capital guiding funds principal-agent systems, weshould design the venture capital guiding funds internal management principal-agentmechanism in order to achieve the systems’s goal. This thesis constructs incentivemechanism models of guiding funds management agency under symmetrical andasymmetrical conditions, and points out that under symmetrical conditions, theguiding funds management agency will make best efforts if the government affordsgood rewards which make marginal revenue equals marginal cost; under asymmetricalconditions, our country should form a reward incentive mechanism of combiningfixed compensation and floating incentive compensation. Besides, incentive intensityshould be determined by professional level, absolutely risk aversion, efforts cost,environment complexity and policy investment limit.(3)In the actual operation of venture capital guiding funds, either directmanagement mode or the commissioned by the social organization management mode,should always be in the principle of achieving the system’s overall goal----topromote high-tech industry and small and medium-sized enterprises development.The reward incentive mechanism of guiding funds management agency should basedon the local conditions. Detailly, for the Nature of Business Unit mode, a rewardincentive mechanism of combining fixed compensation and floating incentive compensation should be formed in order to prevent agent from rent seeking. For theState-owned Company mode, the government should implement necessary constraintsand supervision in order to prevent neglecting " policy strategy" behavior. For thesocial organization management mode, the incentive intensity should be determined inthe section of (0,1) in order to prevent severe agency problem.(4)Venture capital institutions have multi tasks which are alternative, one task is toinvest in high profitability enterprises, another task is to invest in policy supportiveenterprises. This thesis constructs incentive mechanism model of multi-tasks venturecapital institutions. Due to alternative tasks, the effect of incentive mechanism isweaken. In order to achive the systems’s goal, to weak the alternativity or to replacethe alternative task into the complementary task is of great importance.(5)Based on the sight of promoting venture capital guiding funds to operateorderly, this thesis points out principal-agent mechanism of venture capital institutionsas follows: identification and cultivation mechanism of quality investment projects;selection mechanism of venture capital institutions with the industry characteristics;share mechanism of Capital staging in place; venture capital institutions performanceevaluation mechanism combining objective and subjective methods; supervisionmechanism of multi-task venture capital institutions; reputation mechanism of venturecapital institutions.