Study On The Effect In Corporate Governance

In this paper, with theories on corporate governance of the bank creditor, use the10years dynamic data of China listed companies, consider the correlation between governance mechanisms, to study dynamically the effect of corporate governance on bank debt.In the elaboration of the theory, we introduce gradually the theory of"debt governance","bank debt governance"and"the interaction between debt governance mechanism and all the main governance mechanism" at home and abroad.On the base of theory analysis, empirically studies listed companies of China from2000to2010, In order to test different term loan and different property rights nature of the company’s corporate governance effects, We divide bank debt as the total bank loan rate, long-term bank loan rate, short-term bank loan rate, the sample companies are divided into state-owned companies and private companies.Bank loans’regression analysis with the company’s financial performance and the company’s value of five-year segment dynamic data and the10year annual dynamic data, indicating that China’s state-owned enterprises in bank loans remain soft budget constraints, but with the advancement of the banking reform by our government, the budget constraints of state-owned companies and private companies continue to harden, especially after the2005reform, of state-owned enterprises make a certain progress in hardening the budget constraints, but improvement of private enterprise is more apparent.Corporate governance effects of bank debt reflect mainly on the supervision of the manager effect, for the past10years, the most important reform of capital markets happens in2005, to test the results of the reform. We take the year of2005as the time node, in which the tradable share reform of China’s listed companies is started, the supervision effects on managers and their trajectory of the bank debts, are specifically studied. The Studies showed that, due to the complexity of China’s real background and the reform, the supervision effects on managers of bank claims are both in line with classical theories, that is, in line with the market law, and not meet the classical theories, that is, not meet the full market-oriented rules. In recent years, the improvement degree of the supervision effects on managers of the bank debt is not very obvious, especially in private companies and short-term loans. This shows that the effects of the split share reform are still very limited, the task of reform remains heavy and complex, especially the standardization and credit building of the capital markets and enterprises (especially private enterprises) have become problems urgently need to be solved.Corporate governance mechanisms are not independent, in fact, the choice of a governance mechanism depends on another kind of governance mechanism.Thus,the further study of the bank claims’effect on the company need to consider the correlation between governance mechanisms. We regard bank debt governance mechanisms as the initial variables, the main governance mechanism as intermediate variables, Tobin’s Q and other factors as the final variables, to study the interaction between the bank debt governance mechanism and the main governance mechanisms. the results show that bank loans through the main governance mechanisms can affect corporate performance and value.The interaction between the bank debt governance mechanisms and the main governance mechanisms is not the same during different years.We also found state-owned companies facing the weakening of the effect of bank credit and corporate governance problem is more serious, and bank debt governance mechanisms and the main governance mechanisms show different relationships. With the interaction between Bank loans and the competitive markets of product,the control power of the market,bank loans’corporate governance effect is not obvious. The effect of bank loans through Managerial ownership ratio’s corporate governance do not improve obviously.By affecting manager’s annual income,bank loans improve performance. Bank loans by reducing ownership concentration can increase corporate value. But bank loans play a negative role in corporate governance with the interaction of equity balance degree. By affecting two grade separation and independent directors ratio bank loans exert subtle influence on corporate financial performance.Empirical analysis of operating performance and bank loans, the state-owned company’s bank debt governance effects of inter-annual improvement is more obvious. This regression to draw the conclusion "private bank claims on Governance Effect of inter-annual improvement is more obvious" does not match with the management of agency costs’ effect on bank loans. This is due to many factors that affect business performance, simply use the operating performance or agency costs, to study the effect of corporate governance of bank loans is too one-sided. For further study of the bank claims on the company, considering the correlation between governance mechanisms, draw conclusion that the private company there is the effect of weakening of bank credit and corporate governance problems are more serious. Finally, combining the various parts of the empirical results show that the banking reform and enterprise reform has achieved a certain effect, but the problems can not be ignored. Corporate Governance effect of bank debt of the private enterprises are still weak. The proportion of short-term bank loans to total bank loans did not play an active oversight effect. Control markets and the competitive market has not yet set up. Board system has not played its due role. Managerial ownership did not form an effective incentive.With the combination of the status quo of listed company governance, give the appropriate policy recommendations.