The Study Of SSE Information Disclosure Assessment System Impact On Earnings Management

Around the research about earnings management behavior and information disclosure of the listed companies is enduring hot spots of accounting academics. Scholars use the information asymmetry of information economics to explain conditions that the listed company earnings management behavior produced; Practice designs all kinds of information disclosure supervision mechanism using an information-discriminating mechanism to improve the information asymmetry environment, so as to suppress earnings management. The game of earnings management and information disclosure never stops. Taking this as a starting point, this paper hopes to inspection the influence of shenzhen exchange’s information disclosure evaluation system on the listed companies’earnings management, and put forward some suggestions about control the listed companies’earnings management behavior.Based on reviewing the past the related research achievements, this paper puts forward the basic hypothesis on the basis of using the information asymmetry of information economics and information identify principle, and selects data of manufacturing companies which listed on main board A shares of the Shenzhen in2007to2010as research samples. Using the single factor regression and multiple regression analysis, the paper draws the following conclusions:(1) the single factor regression model analysis shows that the inhibitory effect of the information disclosure system of Shenzhen on the listed companies’ earnings management behavior is not obvious;(2) the multiple regression model analysis results showed that in the evaluation system rules of the information disclosure, authenticity and timeliness of information disclosure, the assessment of corporate governance structure of the listed companies can clearly restrain the earnings management behavior. In other words, it can be effectively inhibit listed companies’earnings management behavior. At the same time, in the detailed rules, it is not obvious that the assessment of accurate and integrity, legal and compliance, and the fairness of information disclosure of the listed companies inhibits earnings management behavior, which means that they have failed to restrain the utility of earnings management.For the above research conclusion, this paper gives some explanations from the Angle of the game theory. The "strict assessment, light retribution" phenomenon appearing in this evaluation system is caused by the regulatory authority that is entrusted by the stock market to Shenzhen Stock Exchange and the nature of the institution itself. Only assessment contents involved in the laws and regulations’the rigid constraints content can have standard listed companies’information disclosure, and reduce the degree of earnings management role, But some examination contents of the soft restriction not suppress the purpose of earnings management. On this basis, this paper puts forward advice and suggestions about evaluation system of information disclosure of Shenzhen and securities market’s supervision.