The Research On The Obstruction From The Government-Enterprise To The Railway’s Reform And The Sequence Of The Reform

The reform of monopoly industries is an important part of China’s reform, the success or failure of the monopoly of the industry reform is of great significance to China’s steady economic growth and social stability and harmony. However, there are lots of difficulties in the reform of monopoly industries. Some of the reform of monopoly industries experienced a lot of stages, but many problems still exist; Some industries, such as the railway industry, the reform progress continued stagnation. This article will analyzed about this issue.First, the reform blocking issues. There are more and more problems surfacing in recent years in railway industry, including the tension capacity of passenger and freight transport, the low level of railway service and efficiency, the bidding chaos existing in the field of railway construction and the problems of railway transportation safety. More and more people call on the starting of reform of the railway industry, and the situation is quite urgent, but the curtain of the railway industry reform has yet to be opened. The reasons inside this phenomenon is worth of pondering. The deepening of the reform of the telecommunications industry, with the same or even more complex technical economics comparing to railway industry can negate the single reason from the the complexity explanting the backward of reform of the railway technology economy. Interest groups hinder reform seems to also exist in other monopoly industries, the possible reason may be that interest groups’different affecting ability, and the factors affecting this ability, are maybe that in the railway industry there is more strong the relationship between the government and enterprises.Firstly, this article systematic study of the widespread government-enterprise connection problems in China’s economic, summarizing the different level of politic-firm connection. Second, from the perspective of the interest groups, using game method this article analyses the influence of different levels of government-enterprise relations to reform, combined with the particularity of the railway industry who has more steady government-enterprise connection, interpretting why the progress is so backward. Then, this article will use the data of the political connections of China’s A-share listed companies to make the empirical analysis of the impact of the government-enterprise connection on corporate performance, and analysis from more than one angle that government-enterprise connection’s adversely affection on the the reform of monopoly industries.When discussing what programs should be adopt in the reform of monopoly industries, academia tend to ignore the problem of sequencing of reforms, however, the sequencing of the reform is the key to success of the reform.The paper is divided into five parts:the preface, the obstruction of the government-enterprise connection to the industrial reform, the blocking of government-enterprise connection on the reform of the railway industry, the order of the railway industry reform, and the conclusions and policy recommendations.The first part is the preface, discusses this research background, its theoretical and practical significance; introduced the relative literature, the approach adopted in this paper, as well as this article’s innovation.The second part is the obstruction of the government-enterprise connection to the industrial reform, the main contents of this part including the detailed research on the government-enterprise connection, the analysis of the mechanism of how the reform of monopoly industries being blocked by the government-enterprise connection with the particularity of the railway industry. This section first discusses the concept of the government-enterprise connection, followed summarizes the four levels of government-enterprise relations in our economy; then from the perspective of the central government and the regulatory agencies in the interests of the group using the Stackelberg leader model this section analyses why the reform is blocked, and combined with the railroad industry, there is a analysis about why the railway industry reform is backward.The third part is the blocking of government-enterprise connection on the reform of the railway industry, the contents of this part is, firstly, using political association as a variable representing the government-enterprise connection and researching the refluence of political association on firm performance. Then, This article analyses from several angles about the adverse impact of government-enterprise connection to achieving monopoly industry reform desired effect. Empirical Research on the A-share listed companies as samples, the conclusion is that the influence of political association on corporate performance is negative.The fourth part is the sequence of the railway industry reform. This section conclude that the first job the reform should handle is to change the government-enterprise connection instead of simple recombination, basing on the the obstruction of the government-enterprise connection to the industrial reform and the the adverse impact of government-enterprise connection to achieving monopoly industry reform desired effect.Part five concludes with policy recommendations. The part summarizes the conclusions and makes several policy recommendations.The research method includes the method of combining logical analysis and historical analysis, inductive and deductive, theoretical analysis and measurement analysis combined logic analysis and normative analysis combining research methods.There are three main innovative points of this paper:(1) Making a comprehensive study of the government-enterprise connection, and establishing a system to evaluate the different level of the government-enterprise connection.(2) Taking account the government-enterprise connection into the model of the interest group game model combining with the specification of the railway industry.(3) Using A-share listed companies as the samples to test the impact of the government-enterprise connection on firm performance.The inadequacies of this article, firstly, are the lack of data to support the summarizing different levels of government-enterprise connection; secondly, the analysis of the particularity of the rail industry lack of strong evidence of the case; thirdly, are the lack of a systematic analysis way to discuss the issue of sequence of railway industry reform. This article discuss this issue just based on the conclution that government-enterprise connection is the main obstacle of the railway reform and the history experience of other industries.