Based On The Corporate Governance Of Listed Company Shareholder Support Behavior Research

In recent years, the behavior of controlling shareholders in listed companies has been a hot topic in corporate governance. The concept of "tunneling" and "propping" is a classic description of corporate governance issues. However, most scholars have achieved fruitful and clear evidences of tunneling by making full use of empirical research about tunneling through related party transactions; they rarely study on propping behavior. There are some domestic researches which show that related party transaction is an important method for controlling shareholders to support the company. Because of the special institutional background of China’s capital market and the ownership structure of listed companies, foreign literature have a certain reference value, but can not reveal the mechanism of China share behavior intrinsic motivation and behavior patterns. In the circulation process, all of the shareholders have the consistent basic of interests and common standards of value judgments. Considering maximizing market capitalization, the controlling shareholders will significantly reduce the "tunneling" behavior of listed companies, increasing the propping behavior of listed companies.In this paper, under the background of China’s securities market’s circulation, more and more listed companies realized the full circulation. In the time of "Full Circulation", it makes the interests between major and minor shareholders into the same. As a consequence, to some extent, the pattern of the controlling shareholder’s behavior will be changed and it will affect the corporate governance and performance of the listed companies. Along with the Non-tradable Share Reform is built and the full Circulation is coming. From the point of corporate governance, this paper reviewing the theory of corporate governance, including controlling of major shareholders, the interests of synergistic effect with the effects of trench defense and so on. Through the analysis of the changes about the behavior and the way, the motivation and the influencing factors about the propping behavior of controlling shareholders after the Non-tradable Share Reform. This paper studies the relationship between propping behavior and companies operating performance, propping behavior and corporate governance from one aspect: related party transactions. In the empirical part, the listed manufacturing companies from the year of2008-2010are selected as research samples and one by one single factor analysis and the multiple regression analysis method is applied. The results of empirical study show that the propping behavior of the major shareholders positively correlated with the factors of corporate governance and moreover, propping behavior of related party transactions can improve the listed companies’operating performance significantly. On the basis of empirical analysis, we do some statistical analysis from the behavior of major shareholders and the results of operations in listed manufacturing companies, in order to further verifying the conclusions of the previous research.Finally, in the hope of providing the beneficial references for the managers of listed company, small investors and the regulators, according to the research conclusions, the author puts forward some suggestions and measures.