Board Characteristics And Debt Maturity Choice Of Empirical Research

Debt financing is an important financial strategy for the overall development strategy of the enterprise, the arrangement is one of the key elements of which the debt maturity structure, its structure reasonable direct impact on the cost of capital and asset allocation. Previous research literature point of view, a lot of research on corporate debt maturity structure optimization problems, but most studies mainly focused on the tax rate size, asymmetric information and the characteristics of the enterprises under the conditions of the company’s debt financing preference risk appetite. The purpose of China’s capital market, listed companies there is a unique ownership structure, internal control is serious, weak legal protection of investors, corporate governance mechanism is not perfect, and the uneven development of capital markets and so on, these issues make China’s listed companies board structure the particularity.Firstly, literature review of the debt maturity structure choice theory, and summarize Research on the characteristics of the Board as well as the debt maturity structure at home and abroad, combined with the research of the corporate life cycle, and then put forward the hypothesis. Then through the building division of the corporate life cycle indicators, empirical investigation in different enterprises lifecycle, the board characteristics of corporate debt maturity structure choice. The empirical findings in the formative years of the enterprise, the Board leadership structure and debt maturity structure is negatively correlated, a positive correlation between the size of the board and the debt maturity structure; in mature companies, the stake of the Board of Directors and the debt maturity structure is negatively correlated, a positive correlation between the number of meetings of the Board and debt maturity structure; enterprises in recession, a positive correlation between the number of meetings of the Board and debt maturity structure. Finally, the empirical research results to further strengthen and improve the board governance mechanisms to promote the dynamic adjustment and change of board governance mechanisms to improve the efficiency of capital allocation, and policy recommendations to improve the legal protection of investors.